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Introduction 
There has been a great deal written on the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), from the 
importance of cricket to the life of prisoners in the prison camps on Ceylon and other isles of the 
British Empire. Almost every subject has been thoroughly researched and discussed. However, the 
role of one person, that of Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, has never been thoroughly 
examined. Queen Wilhelmina can be found in almost every study about the Second Anglo-Boer War, 
but none of the literature elaborates on the exact role Wilhelmina played during the conflict. Every 
book has a few phrases that highlights the involvement of Wilhelmina, but that is often the most you 
will read about her in relation to the conflict. Although Wilhelmina’s role is still unclear, she is 
regularly described in literature as an international symbol of Boer support. 
The tensions and causes of the Second Anglo-Boer War can already be found in the early 
though relatively short history of South Africa. The first tensions between the Boers and the British 
originated around 1806, when the Netherlands handed their territory in South Africa over to Great 
Britain after the Battle of Blaauwberg (January 8th, 1806), in light of the Napoleonic Wars.1 The Dutch 
immigrants and Huguenots from different European origins did not think much of the new British 
authorities. The British wanted to decrease the importance of the Dutch language and culture of the 
European settlers, also known as Boers, and raise taxes. In an attempt to remove themselves from 
British authority, the Boers emigrated northwards to create their own independent states. This 
immigration is called the Great Trek (Afrikaans: Die Groot Trek). 
 Despite the Great Trek, tension between the Boers and British kept on rising to its climax in 
1880, with the First Anglo-Boer War (1880-1881). In 1877, the British governor annexed the Boer 
republic of Transvaal. The British motivation was that the virtually bankrupt Transvaal could not 
guarantee the safety of its population against invading native groups. Great Britain took on this task 
now. The government of Transvaal protested but was bribed by the British, except vice president 
Paul Kruger (1828-1904). It would take Kruger multiple years before he was able to unite the Boers 
against British domination. On the 16th of December in 1880, the republic of Transvaal was restored 
and renamed the South African Republic. This conflict would only have three major battles where 
surprisingly the British tasted defeat. The war ended with the Convention of Pretoria on April 5th 
1881, and the Anglo-Boer conflict and tensions appeared to decrease from here onwards. However, 
nothing could be further from the truth, and the following incident happened in 1896. The South 
African Republic (or Transvaal) was startled by a coup d’état, also known as the Jameson Raid. British 
militia entered Transvaal and attempted to evoke a rebellion amongst the primarily British uitlanders 
(outlanders; foreigners, guest workers). The pretext for this raid was the fact that uitlanders were 
                                                          
1 M.R.D. Anderson, Blue Berg: Britain takes the Cape (Cape Town 2008). 
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discriminated in the Boer republics, but the real reason for the raid was probably the very valuable 
minerals such as diamonds and gold that the Boers had found. The Boers were able to stop the raid 
and on top of that, the guest workers did not start a rebellion. However, the Boers now felt directly 
threatened by Great Britain. To protect themselves, the Boer republics sought contact with France 
and Germany and bought modern weapons from these countries. Contact was also sought with 
German South-West Africa, which was unacceptable for the British, as Germany showed an 
increasing interest in expanding their influence and power in Africa.2 The raid also resulted in a closer 
cooperation of the two Boer republics, the South African Republic and the Orange Free State. A 
military pact was concluded in 1897, in opposition to perceived British imperialism.3  
 In an attempt to ease the renewed tensions 
between the Boer republics and Great Britain, a 
conference was arranged by president Steyn of 
the Orange Free State. The now president of the 
South African Republic Paul Kruger and the 
governor of the British Cape Colony Sir Alfred 
Milner met on May 31st 1899 in Bloemfontein. 
Although the conference was arranged to ease 
tensions, ironically it resulted in more friction. The 
subject of the conference was the 
enfranchisement of uitlanders in the Boer 
republics. However, Milner had such high 
demands that the conference was doomed to fail from the start. As a reaction to the failed 
conference, the British sent soldiers to Natal, located along the border with Transvaal. By September 
22nd 1899 the British force had reached the impressive number of 57,000 men. Kruger saw that war 
was inevitable. An ultimatum was sent by Kruger and his parliament to the British. The British had to 
retreat their forces that had accumulated along the border with Transvaal. However, the British did 
not react to the ultimatum that expired on October 12th 1899, and as a result Boer forces attacked 
the Cape Colony and Natal. The Second Anglo-Boer War had begun.     
The initially increasing tensions and the resulting outbreak of war between the Boer 
republics and Great Britain caused friction in international politics as well. Many countries did not 
agree with the British actions. However, these countries did not have the individual power to stand 
up to the British, or they were too afraid to harm their national interests. The British army was, after 
                                                          
2 M. Bossenbroek, De Boerenoorlog (Amsterdam 2014) 138-139. 
3 Bossenbroek, De Boerenoorlog, 140. 
Image 2. The geography of the region: South African 
Republic/Transvaal (Green), Orange Free State (Orange), 
Natal (Red) The British Cape Colony (Blue). 
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all, the strongest and largest force in the world with a navy that was larger than that of France, 
Russia and Germany combined.4 Besides, almost every nation was in some way depending on the 
British Empire in the sphere of natural resources, economy, colonies, etc. Nevertheless, there was in 
many countries a great sympathy and support towards the Boers, especially in Europe.  
There was one country where pro-Boer feelings were the strongest, namely the Netherlands. 
While the Netherlands played a very important role during the Second Anglo-Boer War, these days 
the conflict is a largely forgotten chapter of the Dutch national history. There has been some 
attention to the Second Anglo-Boer War in recent years. The book De Boerenoorlog (The Boer War) 
by Martin Bossenbroek received the Dutch Libris Geschiedenis Prijs (Libris History Prize) in 2013. Also, 
the year 2017 was unofficially dedicated to the commemoration of 400 years of Dutch-South African 
relations, in which the Second Anglo-Boer War played an important part. The Rijksmuseum in 
Amsterdam presented a large exhibition on this subject, which was accompanied by a published 
book and a television series of seven episodes.5 However, little attention is paid to the Second Anglo-
Boer War in Dutch schools and universities, and the war does not have a place in the Dutch 
consciousness. Only some neighbourhoods and street names recall the era. Although the Dutch state 
did not undertake any military action, thousands of Dutchmen decided to join the Boers and fight 
with them.6 Also, numerous citizens’ initiatives were introduced in the Netherlands to collect and 
send funds, food, clothing and other necessities to the Boers. By far, the Netherlands was the 
country that tried to promote the Boer interests the most. Alongside the official representatives of 
the Boer republics, the young Queen Wilhelmina (1880-1962) became one of the most prominent 
international figures in the pro-Boer movement. Although no existing literature refers to Wilhelmina 
as a “patroness of the Boer-cause”, such an image is created through the many laudatory poems, 
personal letters, certificates and other ways of showing gratitude to Wilhelmina from the 
international public during and shortly after the conflict.7 8 9  
Since 1885 a tradition began where the birthday of princess Wilhelmina was publically 
celebrated in the Netherlands. After Wilhelmina’s coronation, the day was renamed Koninginnedag 
(Queensday). August 31st 1901, was Wilhelmina’s 21st birthday. It is not surprising that in 1901 
festivities were organised to celebrate Wilhelmina’s birthday in the Netherlands, but it is surprising 
that it was also celebrated in Boer prisoner of war camps on, for example, Bermuda, Saint-Helena 
                                                          
4 Koninklijk Huisarchief, Den Haag, inv. A50-XVI, nr. 57.2. 
5 Rijksmuseum, https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/nl/goede-hoop (consulted on 4-11-2017). 
6 V. Kuitenbrouwer, War of words: Dutch pro-Boer propaganda and the South African War (1899-1902) 
(Amsterdam 2012) 177. 
7 A. Pijnacker Hordijk, Voor Wilhelmina en voor Kruger (Naaldwijk 1900/1901). 
8 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken: Kabinet en Protocol, nummer toegang 
2.05.18, inventarisnummer 803. 
9 Koninklijk Huisarchief, inv. 10A-XIII, Certificaat. 
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and Ceylon (Sri Lanka).10 The fact that the day was referred to as Wilhelmina-dag (Wilhelmina day) 
instead of Queensday suggests that the Boers did not see Wilhelmina as their queen. However, it 
does mean that Wilhelmina held a special place in the hearts and minds of the Boers, as they 
devoted an entire day of sports, theatre plays and other festivities in her name.11 These sources 
underline the international public’s perception of queen Wilhelmina’s role during the Second Anglo-
Boer War. 
Wilhelmina did not see herself as the heroine or patroness of the Boers. On January 29th, 
1902, she looked back on the period since she had become queen and wrote in a notebook: “For the 
whole world I became a heroine, very easy, but not complimentary, since I had done nothing in this 
case, received the most ridiculous letters from places all over the world; especially a steady flow of 
praises came from France! I have never seen such an exaggerated reaction.”12 Despite her own 
opinion, the name Wilhelmina is connected to the Second Anglo-Boer War to this date, as her name 
and persona can be found in almost all the literature regarding the Second Anglo-Boer War. 
However, what did Wilhelmina actually do for the Boers and their cause? This is an especially 
interesting question as existing literature on the Second Anglo-Boer War does not elaborate on her 
exact role, but foremost because Wilhelmina said: “(…) but I have done more for the Boers than my 
fellow countrymen will ever know (…)”13. This statement therefore provides an opportunity to look 
into what Wilhelmina actually did, but also what she has done out of the view of the general public.  
Before this question can be answered, it is necessary to understand the relationship between 
the Netherlands and the Boer republics. The first chapter will therefore analyse how Wilhelmina 
perceived this relation, as it might have influenced her actions. Other existing opinions in the 
Netherlands will be discussed as well. The second chapter will discuss what the Netherlands did in 
support of the Boers, and what Wilhelmina’s role was in these actions. The third chapter will discuss 
the multiple attempts of intervention and mediation between Great Britain and the Boer republics. 
                                                          
10 E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, Wilhelmina-dag op Ceylon: herinneringsalbum van de Ragamafeesten op den 31sten 
augustus 1901 (Haarlem 1901) 7. 
11Douwes Dekker, Wilhelmina-dag op Ceylon: herinneringsalbum van de Ragamafeesten op den 31sten 
augustus 1901, 7. 
12 Koninklijk Huisarchief, inv. A50-XVI, nr. 57.2. “Voor de gehele wereld werd ik eene heldin, recht gemakkelijk, 
maar niet complimenteus, daar ik u deze zaak toch niets gedaan had, kreeg de bespottelijkste brieven van alle 
oorden der wereld; vooral van uit Frankrijk vloeide de stroom der loftuitingen mild! Nooit heb ik zulk eene 
overdreven beweging gezien.”  
13 E. van Raalte, Staatshoofd en ministers: Nederlands constitutionele monarchie historisch-staatsrechtelijk 
belicht (Zwolle 1971) 200. “(…) maar heb meer gedaan voor de Boeren dan mijne landgenooten weten (…)” 
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Again, Wilhelmina’s role in these interventions will be 
analysed. The fourth and last chapter will compare the 
actions of Wilhelmina, the German emperor Wilhelm II and 
the Russian Tsar Nicolas II. Although multiple European 
states and their leaders did support the Boer republics 
during the Second Anglo-Boer War, Wilhelmina seems to 
have had a special place in the hearts and minds of the 
Boers and also in the history of the Second Anglo-Boer 
War. It is therefore necessary to compare their actions, 
positions and to what extent they were limited in 
supporting the Boers by those positions. All of this is vital to 
answer the question of what Wilhelmina actually did for 
the Boer cause.  
As stated before, there is not much literature 
specifically on Wilhelmina’s role during the Second Anglo-Boer War. The only book that touches on 
the subject is Wilhelmina: De jonge koninging (Wilhelmina: The young queen) by Cees Fasseur. This 
book is a biography of Wilhelmina’s life, with a sub-chapter dedicated to the Second Anglo-Boer War. 
Although this sub-chapter discusses some of the matters that this research will also mention 
regarding Wilhelmina’s actions during the conflict, Fasseur conducts a rather superficial analysis, 
analysing her actions in a wider geopolitical context. Fasseur did use the same (primary) sources as 
this research, but besides some quotations, does not go in depth on Wilhelmina’s thoughts, actions, 
ideas or motivations. This research will go more in depth on these matters, including her specific 
actions that benefited the Boer cause.  
Another book that can provide insights into Wilhelmina’s personal life is the book Eenzaam 
maar niet alleen (Lonely but not alone). This is a memoir by Wilhelmina in which she looks back on 
her personal life, especially her childhood in the 1880’s and 1890’s. She discusses very personal 
childhood struggles, the evolution of her character and personal relations, but she consciously 
refuses to discuss political subjects. However, this book provides valuable insights into how 
Wilhelmina experienced the life at court, the life of a queen-to-be and how her opinions, ideas and 
character developed throughout her childhood.   
The Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs, Willem Hendrik de Beaufort, was often occupied with 
the Second Anglo-Boer War. Because of his position, he was also in close contact with Queen 
Wilhelmina. His diary was published by J.P. de Valk. It provides insights into his personal opinions, 
but also those of Wilhelmina because of their close relationship.  
Image 3. Portrait of President Paul Kruger. 
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Another person who was in close contact with Queen Wilhelmina was the vice-president of 
the Council of State J.W.M. Schorer. In Raadsman achter de troon (Counselor behind the Throne), 
another book edited by J.P. de Valk, the diary of Schorer is published. As the vice-president of the 
Council of State, Schorer was the political and constitutional advisor of the head of state. Since his 
appointment in 1897, Schorer made notes of his meetings with Queen-regent Emma, Queen 
Wilhelmina and her husband prince Hendrik. Schorer’s notes provide an insight into the way 
Wilhelmina interpreted her task, and also her struggles with the Dutch constitution and her limited 
amount of power. 
Apart from the limited literature specifically about Wilhelmina’s role, and other more general 
literature on the Second Anglo-Boer War, examination of the Netherlands around 1900 and the 
Dutch-Boer relations can help understand the role Wilhelmina played in a wider context. De 
Boerenoorlog (The Boer War), a book by Martin Bossenbroek, was awarded the Dutch Libris 
Geschiedenis Prijs. This book tells the story of the Boer War from the perspective of three important 
individuals from the War. What is more important for this research is that this book is written along 
Dutch themes, which might give a better insight in Dutch opinion and involvement in the Second 
Anglo-Boer War.  
Another important work for this research is Holland op zijn breedst (Holland on its widest), 
also by Martin Bossenbroek. In this book, Bossenbroek describes Dutch society around 1900, the 
emergence of Dutch nationalism, imperialism, the Dutch national and international politics and a 
new national self-awareness. The Dutch achievements in the Malay Archipelago and more 
importantly, the achievements of the kinsmen in South Africa and its reflection on Dutch society play 
an important role in this book. 
A book which goes deeper into the Dutch-Boer relations is Nederland en de opkomst van het 
moderne imperialisme (the Netherlands and the emerge of modern imperialism) by M. 
Kuitenbrouwer. In his book, Kuitenbrouwer describes the rise of Dutch imperialism and its evolution, 
focusing especially on Aceh and the Dutch-Boer relations in South-Africa.  
As a result of the limited coverage in the literature of Wilhelmina and the Second Anglo-Boer 
War, this research has to base its findings to some extent on primary or archival sources. This 
research was permitted to consult documents from the Royal House Archives (Koninklijk Huisarchief), 
located on the premises of Palace Noordeinde in The Hague. This is the private archive of the Dutch 
royal family. Therefore, this research had access to unique correspondences, notes and multiple self-
written notebooks of Queen Wilhelmina. This research is therefore able to examine personal 
opinions of the queen regarding the Second Anglo-Boer War. The most important documents for this 
research from this archive are three notebooks from a series of four, written by Wilhelmina herself 
on January 29th 1902. That means that she was 21 years old at the time when she wrote down her 
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thoughts, almost four months before the official end of the war. In these notebooks Wilhelmina 
describes her experiences of the first 3.5 years as queen of the Netherlands.  
Also used for this research was the National Archive in The Hague. The National Archive 
manages the archives of the government, but also the archives of societal organisations and 
individuals who were of national importance. Documents relating to the government and 
Department of Foreign Affairs in the period 1899-1902 relating to the Second Anglo-Boer War which 
can provide especially valuable information for this research are located here. 
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Queen Wilhelmina and the Boer Republics 
The Dutch relationship with South Africa starts with the creation of the refreshment station on the 
south point of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, in 1652. The station was founded by Jan van Riebeeck, 
by commission of the Dutch United East Indies Company (Dutch: Vereenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie (VOC)). The station was used by the VOC to refresh supplies on ships that travelled 
between the Netherlands and Asia. Although a Dutch overseas possession, there was not much 
public interest in the Cape Colony. The VOC did not appreciate attention for their work overseas. 
Furthermore, the Cape Colony was “just” a refreshment station. The public was far more interested 
in the possessions in Asia, which actually produced the valuables.14         
As stated in the introduction, the Cape Colony was ceded to the British in 1806 as a result of 
the Napoleonic Wars. This meant that the overseas possession, with approximately 26,000 white 
inhabitants of mostly Dutch descent, were now completely out of Dutch control.15 The Dutch lack of 
interest continued during important events such as the Great Trek and the founding of the Boer 
republics. 
However, Dutch interest in the Boers and South Africa developed from 1880 onwards, when 
news about the Boer struggle to retake and re-establish the British-annexed Boer republic of 
Transvaal (First Anglo-Boer War, 1880-1881) reached the Netherlands. This not only affected the 
interaction between the Boers and the Dutch, but also how they perceived their relations. This 
chapter will therefore discuss how Wilhelmina perceived relations with the Boer republics and also 
the origins of these relations. It is important for this research to understand Wilhelmina’s view on 
these relations, as it might have influenced the decisions and actions that she took. To assess if 
Wilhelmina’s opinion about these relations was common or uncommon, this chapter will therefore 
also discuss other ideas about what these relations should look like.     
 
Kinship 
In the mid-19th century, the Netherlands were still adapting to their new position in the world. The 
Dutch were still looking back at the Dutch Golden Age (17th century), when they were the centre of 
trade and played a leading role in international politics. Since the Napoleonic Wars, the overseas 
possessions of the Netherlands had shrunk. With the cession of Ceylon (modern-day Sri Lanka) and 
the Cape Colony, the Netherlands had lost its strategic positions along important sea lanes to the 
Indies. Furthermore, after 1854, the Dutch lost their monopoly on trade with Japan. From a place of 
                                                          
14 B.J.H. Graaf, De mythe van de stamverwantschap: Nederland en de Afrikaners 1902-1930 (Vrije Universiteit 
1993) 1. 
15 Graaf, De mythe van de stamverwantschap, 1. 
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leadership in the Western World in nearly every sphere of life, it had fallen behind the other 
countries of Western Europe.16 The decreasing importance of the Netherlands was also felt on a 
national level. It took the Netherlands quite some time to recover from the ravages of the French 
period (1795-1813). Despite efforts by William I of the Netherlands (nicknamed the merchant king 
(1772-1843)) to stimulate trade and industry, the Netherlands did not start to recover until the last 
two decades of the 19th century.17  
 Although a small power, the Netherlands had the characteristics of a major power. It 
possessed a disproportional large empire and fought, just as other major European powers did at 
that time, a colonial war in Aceh (1873-1914). However, the country was far too weak to engage in 
power politics. It was unable to protect its colonial empire, and even protecting the motherland was 
problematic with the now unified German state in the east and Great Britain in the west.18 To protect 
its own territory and empire, the Netherlands had to follow a strict policy of neutrality, which was 
based on three pillars: keep as much as possible out of the power politics of the major powers, 
preserving the Dutch neutrality during international conflicts and promoting the international free 
trade/market.19   
The rise of Dutch interest in the Boers coincides with the emergence of Dutch nationalism. 
Dutch nationalism was characterized by a new colonial interest, the kinship and struggle of the Boers 
and re-found pride in the Dutch royal family.20 According to Schutte, the modernising and revitalising 
Dutch society was stimulated by the First Anglo-Boer War.21 As discussed before, the Dutch felt that 
there was not much to be proud of on a national and international level, but many started to identify 
themselves with the Boers. They saw the Boers as members of the Dutch tribe, kinsmen (Dutch: 
stamverwanten) on a different continent. The Boers spoke Dutch, were Calvinists and were fighting 
as a small nation against a major power. This was very recognizable for the Dutch.  
The idea of kinship was the theme for the relations from 1880/1881 until the end of the Boer 
republics in 1902. The kinship-rhetoric based itself around the historic and cultural bond between the 
Boers and the Dutch. The mutual feelings of kinship accounted for a mutual favourable disposition. 
But the Dutch also felt it was their moral obligation to support ‘their relatives’.  
Although the intensive relations between the Netherlands and the Boer republics started 
around 1880/1881, the seeds for the renewed relations were already planted a few years before. 
                                                          
16 A. Vandenbosch, Dutch foreign policy since 1815: a study in small power politics (Den Haag 1959) 70. 
17 Vandenbosch, Dutch foreign policy since 1815, 70. 
18 Ibidem 71. 
19 G.J. Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners: adhesie en aversie (Franeker 1986) 5. 
20 M. Bossenbroek, Holland op zijn breedst: Indië en Zuid-Afrika in de Nederlandse cultuur omstreeks 1900 
(Amsterdam 1996) 12. 
21 Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 5. 
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Perhaps more interestingly, it was initiated by the Boers. In 1875, the Consul General of the Republic 
of the Orange Free State, H. A. L. Hamelberg, visited the Nederlandse Taal- en Letteren Congres 
(Dutch Language and Literature Congress) in Maastricht, the Netherlands. Here, Hamelberg 
addressed the audience, pleading for support for the neglected brothers (verwaarloosde broeders) in 
South Africa.22 Hamelberg was pleading for a more intensive relationship between the nations, 
however it’s not clear how intensive this was to be. Based on the forum where he spoke these words, 
one can argue that this relationship was foremost on a cultural level. That same year, the president 
of the Transvaal T.F. Burgers visited the Netherlands as well. Burgers wanted to change the Dutch 
perspective of the Boers in South Africa, but also to show Dutch possibilities in the Boer republics. 
However, he also spoke about the idea of a Greater Holland below the Southern Cross (Groot Holland 
onder het Zuiderkruis).23 Contrary to the statements made by Hamelberg, Burgers’ remarks are quite 
clearly suggesting a desire of the incorporation of the Boer republics (or at least the Transvaal) in the 
Dutch Kingdom/Empire.   
The support for and the identification with the Boers also fits in with the Dutch moralistic 
view of the late 19th century. According to Boogman, the Dutch looked moralistically down on the 
crude power politics of the major European powers.24 The Boers fought in 1880 for the liberation of 
the Transvaal, which Great Britain had officially recognized in 1852, but defiled in 1877. It was a 
conflict about respecting international law and the sovereignty of a nation and its people. As a small, 
militarily weak state, the Netherlands valued this right highly. If Great Britain won this conflict, it 
would provide a precedent for other major powers to annex and conquer small nations. Therefore, 
the Boers were not only fighting for themselves but also for other small nations and the freedom of 
its population, such as the Netherlands.25 An aspect of self-interest is seen here.  
There are also other examples of Dutch self-interest. The Dutch identified themselves with 
the Boers, but also with what they did. Internationally the word ‘Dutch’ was now also used for the 
Boers.26 A new national confidence rose and grew with every victory of their cousins over the British, 
but also the self-esteem and international prestige of the Dutch grew. The conflict in the Transvaal 
had another result on Dutch society, which was becoming heavily segregated along political, religious 
and social lines. The First Anglo-Boer War, and later the Second Anglo-Boer War, touched people 
                                                          
22 W. Jonckheere, ‘Myth and Afrikaner Idealization in Dutch Historical Novels’ in: History in Dutch Studies 
(Oxford 2003) 87. 
23 Jonckheere, ‘Myth and Afrikaner Idealization in Dutch Historical Novels’ in: History in Dutch Studies, 87. 
24 Graaf, De mythe van de stamverwantschap, 2. 
25 Koninklijk Huisarchief, inv. A50-XVI, nr. 57.3. 
26 Koninklijk Huisarchief, inv. A50-XVI, nr. 57.3. 
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from all walks of Dutch society. It unified the population, despite the different political, religious and 
social convictions.27   
 
New Holland 
The First Anglo-Boer War ended in 1881, and resulted in the re-establishment of the independent 
Boer republic Transvaal under the new name South African Republic. Although the newspaper’s 
interest in the Boers ended, the interest of the Dutch population continued through the 
establishment of organisations such as the Nederlandsch Zuid-Afrikaansche Vereeniging (Dutch South 
African Society (NZAV)). Organisations such as the NZAV informed the Dutch public about the events 
in South Africa, but also promoted closer ties with the Boers.  
 From 1881 onwards, the Dutch attitude towards the Boer republics started to change. The 
Boer victory changed the Dutch perception of the Boers completely. The Boers had been seen as lazy, 
degenerate and sly. Yet after their victory over the British, they were regarded by the Dutch as heroic 
lost brothers, Hollandsche Afrikaners (Dutch Afrikaners) and as distant cousins with Dutch rebel 
blood in their veins (de verre neef met Geuzenbloed in de aderen).28  
With this new positive perspective of the Boer, the idea of kinship was extended to an 
attitude of “cultural imperialism”.29 The cultural imperialism was mostly concerned around 
education, immigration and investments. But overall, there was now much more interaction between 
the nations. The NZAV for example, recruited emigrants to go to South Africa, to help develop the 
Boer republics.  
 As stated before, education was part of the cultural imperialism. Many scholars were active 
in the NZAV. Because neither of the Boer republics had a university, these men wanted to improve 
the opportunities for the Boers to go and study in the Netherlands. The studiefonds (study fund) was 
founded in 1885 by the NZAV for this purpose. Despite the fund, only 45 students participated in the 
program until 1902.30 Furthermore, the program led to tensions between the liberals and Protestants 
in the Netherlands. In general, Dutch universities were liberal institutions, except for the newly 
founded Free University which was founded by the orthodox Protestant Abraham Kuyper. Kuyper 
tried to persuade the South African Republic’s government to send members of the program to his 
                                                          
27 Graaf, De mythe van de stamverwantschap, 3. 
28 Jonckheere, ‘Myth and Afrikaner Idealization in Dutch Historical Novels’ in: History in Dutch Studies, 88. 
29 G.J. Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 41. 
30 Schutte, Nederland en de Afrikaners, 52. 
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university only. The Boers ignored Kuypers’ suggestion and other universities remained very popular 
among the Boers.31  
 Language was another important issue for academics. To ensure a more intensive 
relationship between the Netherlands and the Boer republics, a common language was seen as an 
absolute requirement. Although Dutch and the High-Dutch (Hoog-Hollandsch) of the Boers are 
closely related, they are different. Moreover, in the late 19th century Afrikaans was on the rise. Due 
to the complicated grammar and rules, Dutch was far less popular at schools than English. Therefore, 
students often decided to learn English because it was easier for them.32 In the Netherlands the 
Vereeniging tot vereenvoudiging van onze schrijftaal (Society for the simplification of our written 
language) was founded, as it was thought that a simpler form of Dutch would benefit ties with the 
kinsmen in South Africa.33  
 After the end of the annexation, the national institutions of the South African Republic grew 
rapidly as a result of the gold rush. However, Kruger felt that the candidates from the South African 
Republic were underqualified. The candidates from the British Cape Colony were not trusted by the 
Boers; even the Dutch speaking candidates were unattractive for political reasons. Kruger therefore 
searched for candidates in the Netherlands. During the 1890’s approximately 18% of all officials in 
the South African Republic were born in the Netherlands.34 Because of the many Dutchmen in 
important positions and the mutual favourable idea of kinship, some started to dream about a ‘New 
Holland’. 
As stated before, it was the South African Republic’s president Burgers who spoke in 1875 of 
the idea of a Greater Holland below the Southern Cross. This idea of New Holland (or Greater 
Holland) can be divided into two interpretations, a positive and a negative interpretation. The 
positive interpretation is where the Boer republics would be incorporated in the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. The traditional concept of a colony, one could say, with the exception that the 
relationship would be more about cooperation than Dutch domination. This interpretation is positive 
due to the idea that the Dutch territory would increase, together with the economy, international 
importance, prestige and self-confidence of the Dutch.35  
 The negative interpretation of New Holland is fuelled by the Dutch pessimistic view at that 
time. Since the separation of Belgium, the Netherlands was a small, militarily weak nation. The major 
powers in Europe were trying to expand their influence in every way possible. The Dutch knew that 
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the Netherlands could not do anything in case of an invasion. Therefore, they saw in the Boer 
republics a place of refuge.36 A place with a similar language, religion and people. The Dutch wanted 
to keep the Boer republics independent so that if something happened to the Netherlands, they 
could flee to the Boer republics and continue their existence. It does not necessarily mean that the 
Boer republics came under the Dutch realm. This pessimistic, defensive interpretation is supported 
by the historians Kuitenbrouwer, Schutte and Van Koppen. 
However, all the reasons mentioned in this chapter can be traced back to a single fear - the 
disappearance of the Dutch tribe or race. This perception is expressed by the minister of Foreign 
Affairs De Beaufort in his diary which is dated September 1900. In this piece, De Beaufort questions 
the ability of the Dutch to maintain a country or territory, and at the same time retain international 
relations. “This is the second time in this century that the Dutch tribe is set back in her political 
development by the power of events. Belgium became officially a French country, with French as 
official language. (…) It would be an important study, to examine to which extent the peculiarities of 
the Dutch character contributed to the course of events. Does the Dutchmen lack what is needed for 
the foundation and retaining a nation?”37 
 Reforming the Boer republics into a Dutch colony was also against the moral conviction of 
the Dutch. As stated before, the conflict between the Transvaal and the British was the struggle for 
the smaller nations and the right of self-determination and respect for international law. The 
Netherlands would lose prestige if they first supported the Boers, but then colonised them 
themselves. Besides that, without Boer consent the Netherlands would be unable to enforce reform 
of the Boer republics into a Dutch colony. 
The increasing Dutch relation/bond was not supported by every inhabitant of the Boer 
republics. Two particular groups were against the growing influence of the Dutch. The first group 
were the uitlanders. Uitlanders were the (mainly British) workmen that mostly arrived during the 
gold rush in Transvaal. Exact figures are uncertain, as the first census of the Transvaal was not taken 
until April 1904. However, the Transvaal government made policy on the assumption that there were 
60,000 uitlanders to 30,000 Transvaalers (figures refer to adult males only).38 Others claimed the 
ratio to be 4:1 or even 10:1.39 Despite being a huge portion of the population, the uitlanders had very 
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limited political rights and were heavily taxed. The uitlanders associated the Dutchmen with the rule 
of Kruger, who kept the uitlanders marginalised and disenfranchised. The second group were the so-
called progressives. This group had far more influence because it consisted of people who were born 
in the South African Republic (so called burghers), and therefore had the right to vote in the Boer 
republics. This group supported closer ties with the British Cape Colony, and therefore stood in sharp 
contrast to Kruger’s policy of strongly defending the independence of the South African Republic and 
British influence.40  
 
Wilhelmina 
The popularity of the Dutch royal family was to some extent a representation of the Dutch 
pessimistic view at that time. Many scandals, such as the homosexual relations of King William II 
(1792-1849) and several dozen illegitimate children from various mistresses by King William III (1817-
1890) had decreased the popularity of the Dutch royal family amongst the Dutch population.41     
 This negative attitude towards the royal family started to change during the second marriage 
of King William III with Princess Emma of Waldeck and Pyrmont (1858-1934) in 1879. Despite the 
immense 41 year difference in age, the news of the second marriage was received by the parliament 
and ministers without any objections. However, the Dutch public reacted in general with indifference 
and prejudice because of the age difference.42  
 An event where Emma managed to increase their popularity was just after the failed 
Jameson Raid in 1896. The Jameson Raid was a climax 
between Boers and British, but also between the 
Dutch and British. The news of the failed Jameson Raid 
was received with great happiness in the Netherlands. 
The British were offended by the Dutch reaction. It 
was Emma who decided to visit the British envoy in 
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Image 4. Queen Wilhelmina, coronation painting, 
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The Hague, with which she gained a lot of respect form the Dutch politicians and public.43    
The birth of a new princess, Wilhelmina, was also received with great happiness. The positive 
perception the Dutch population had of Emma was very important after 1888 when it was decided to 
give the custody over princess Wilhelmina to Emma, because William III was suffering from 
dementia.44 Emma already had a strong voice in how Wilhelmina was raised, especially since 1884 
when the last son of three from William III’s first marriage died. This meant that Wilhelmina was now 
first in line to become queen of the Netherlands.  
 King William III eventually died due to his illness in 1890. Although Wilhelmina was next in 
line, she had not reached adulthood yet. This meant that Queen Emma became regent until 
Wilhelmina was legally an adult on August 31st 1898. 
 During her lifetime, Wilhelmina grew to become a strong, respected queen, loved by her 
subjects. Two women in particular, her mother Emma and her governess Miss Winter, played an 
important role in Wilhelmina’s upbringing, the formation of her character and therefore also her 
popularity as queen. Wilhelmina admired Miss Winter for her strong, open and sincere personality. 
In her memoir Wilhelmina describes Miss Winter: “She herself did not hide for anybody or evade 
anyone. She was a ‘bold woman’.”45 Throughout her life, Wilhelmina was a bold woman as well. 
Emma contributed strongly to Wilhelmina’s life. The title of her memoir, Eenzaam maar niet 
alleen (Lonely but not alone) underlines Wilhelmina’s feelings. She describes how she felt as if she 
was locked up in “the cage (de kooi)”. There were always people around her, but only with a few she 
could act as Wilhelmina, express her true personal opinions, and not as the queen or queen-to-be. 
Wilhelmina states: “(…), only in the intimacy with mother I could be just a human.”46 As a child, but 
especially during her reign, Emma remained for Wilhelmina the person to turn to for advice.  
Emma played an important role in the popularity of Wilhelmina amongst the Dutch subjects 
and in renewing the Dutch monarchy. Emma organised PR events, in which Wilhelmina, in the 
beginning as the young queen-to-be and later as queen, played an important role. Both Emma and 
Wilhelmina were able to renew the monarchy, which was now surrounded by ceremonial, militaristic 
display and the royal family was exalted as a national symbol.47 And this loving relationship was 
mutual. For example, Wilhelmina insisted that on her coronation no “crowned heads” would be 
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present. Nothing was supposed to stand between her and her people. She did not want to be 
distracted by foreign royalties, but devoted herself to the Dutch public.48   
 Despite only being 18 years old, she was able to impress foreign diplomats and heads of 
state. Every time Wilhelmina gave a speech to diplomats, she managed to impress them. The 
combination of her young appearance, her strong and clear voice, and the appearance of standing 
there without being nervous or scared, are common reactions to her speeches.49   
Despite being loved by her subjects and impressing foreign diplomats and heads of state, 
Wilhelmina was not always comfortable with the role she had to play as a queen(-to be) in her 
personal life, but also within the parliamentary constitutional monarchy that the Netherlands was 
(and still is). Especially in regard to the Second Anglo-Boer War, Wilhelmina was struggling with the 
limitations of her position. She wrote in her notebook: “(…) the government did not fulfil the urge in 
their hearts and I felt that the public wished to see me openly revealing my sympathy for our 
kinsmen; how could I as the head of state!” 50 Wilhelmina had this feeling of powerlessness since 
childhood. As stated before, she felt she was locked in a ‘cage’, making it impossible to express her 
true feelings or act in the way she wanted to. “Already then, there was in my subconsciousness an 
unsatisfactoriness about the powerlessness, which was accompanied by being locked in a cage, 
whereby made taking an initiative, of any kind, impossible.51      
 Despite being closely related to the British royal family, Wilhelmina always spoke highly of 
the Boers. Throughout her writings, she referred to the Boers as “kinsmen” (stamverwanten) and a 
“blood relationship/ consanguinity” (bloedverwantschap). In a letter to Queen Victoria on September 
8th 1899, Wilhelmina elaborates on these feelings when she writes: “to one of which I am attached by 
bonds of friendship, to other by ties of common origin.”52 Wilhelmina cleverly avoids saying which 
relation refers to the Boers and which one to Victoria and the British royal family. However, with this 
letter she openly declares that the Dutch and the Boers are related. 
 It is not that surprising that Wilhelmina became anti-British when looking at the environment 
she grew up in. Wilhelmina grew up during times of increasing tensions between the Boers and 
British. Wilhelmina was born in 1880, which means that she was only one at the time of the First 
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Anglo-Boer war and too young to be aware of the events happening around her at the time. 
However, as previously discussed, the First Anglo-Boer War had greatly influenced the Dutch society. 
It was this atmosphere of re-found nationalism, pride and moralistic struggles that influenced her 
ideas and actions. As the tensions between the Boers and the British kept on rising, anti-British 
sentiments increased amongst Wilhelmina and the Dutch population.  
As a result of these anti-British feelings, the Netherlands started to shift their focus from 
Great Britain to Germany. During the 1890’s, the Dutch trade with Germany grew tremendously. The 
modernisation of the Dutch economy was, to a great extent, based on German investments, 
technology and market. 53 Wilhelmina’s close and heartfelt family ties with Germany, and because 
Kaiser Wilhelm and Queen Wilhelmina both supported the Boer effort of independence and were 
against British policy in the war, contributed to this shift of focus. Also, with the increasing tension 
between Great Britain and the Netherlands, because of the passive Dutch support, it is not 
unthinkable that Wilhelmina believed that Germany could help the Netherlands in case of an 
escalating conflict.54 Around 1900 there came repeatedly from the German side a plea for a common 
customs union, followed by close political and military collaboration in Europe and overseas. The 
Dutch ambassador in Berlin, Van Tets van Goudriaan, reported that admiral von Tirpitz and other 
‘high-ranking seaman and commanding officers’, but also ‘industrialists, merchants and scholars’ 
insisted on such collaboration, especially because of England.55 Van Tets van Goudriaan’s report 
suggests that Germany saw the Netherlands as part of their zone of influence. In case of a conflict, 
Germany would therefore support (and probably help) the Netherlands. However, the fact that the 
Netherlands had to watch out for Germany’s influence was also seen in the Netherlands itself. 
Kuyper warned for the “germanification of our people on different aspects”.56 Also Wilhelmina 
warned against too much collaboration, especially in regard to the Dutch Indies.57  
Wilhelmina’s anti-British sentiments also had implications for her personal life. When 
suitable candidates for marriage were proposed, British candidates were not even considered. 
However, despite Wilhelmina’s anti-British sentiments in general, she remained pragmatic and open 
to personal relations and respect between British subjects and herself. As stated before, 
Wilhelmina’s governess, the British Miss Winter, remained a close friend throughout her life. Despite 
their close friendship, Wilhelmina did not spare Miss Winter from her pro-Boer and anti-British 
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feelings. Wilhelmina once told Miss Winter that the Boers were ‘excellent shots’, who have mastered 
the art of warfare.58  
 Despite tension and conflicting beliefs about the Boer republics, Wilhelmina demanded that 
the British royal family (but also Great Britain as a whole) be treated with the utmost respect, 
preventing any cause of the British being offended and escalating the decreasing relationship even 
more. In one of Wilhelmina’s journals, she describes another “incident”(of which the date is not 
specified). The British queen often travelled via the harbour of Flushing (Dutch: Vlissingen) and took 
the train to Germany. At the passing train stations, Dutchmen were standing at the platforms singing 
the Transvaal national anthem. Wilhelmina wrote: “(…) once and nevermore, because I said 
measures had to be taken so the people at the stations would not be able to get even near the 
Queen.”59  
Although supporting the Boers, Wilhelmina was very critical of the press in the Netherlands 
and abroad. As historian Vincent Kuitenbrouwer describes in his book War of Words, the press 
played an important role in the Second Anglo-Boer War. Contrary to the European governments and 
heads of state, the newspaper expressed and even exaggerated the feelings of the general public. 
Wilhelmina therefore accused the press of being subjective, whipping up the public and distorting or 
exaggerating the actual events in the Boer republics. But Wilhelmina found the caricatures the worst, 
mocking Queen Victoria and her councillors. Although Wilhelmina criticised the Dutch press, she 
adds that “the caricatures were by far surpassed by those of other countries”.60 
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However, this negative feeling is contrary to an audience which Wilhelmina had with the 
board of the Nederlandse Journalistenkring (Dutch Journalist Circle (NJK)), represented by its 
chairman Abraham Kuyper, vice-chairman P.J. Appel and secretary J. Deen. During this audience, 
Wilhelmina expressed her warm approval of Kuypers very pro-Boer article in Revue des Deux 
Mondes. Wilhelmina hoped that this article would be spread abroad, especially in the United States. 
After the audience was publicised in the Dutch press, the American envoy to the Hague, Stanford 
Newel, asked De Beaufort for an explanation. The startled De Beaufort denied the correctness of the 
reports. However, Kuyper notified Leyds that 
“the comments of the Queen “(…) were 
stronger than the newspapers reported”.61 
Although it seems that Wilhelmina 
perceived the relationship from a kinship point 
of view, she also describes the pessimistic 
view. On April 1st 1902, she wrote that the 
nations of the world “(…) by not going against 
England, silently honoured the principles for a 
major power to destroy a smaller one.”62 
Wilhelmina knew that the Dutch army was no 
match against Great Britain or a united 
Germany. It was therefore a reasonable fear 
that what was happening in South Africa could 
happen to the Netherlands as well.  
As discussed previously, the pessimistic 
view contained the conviction that the Boer republics were seen as a place of refuge for the Dutch in 
case the Netherlands ceased to exist. Wilhelmina’s statement does not mention this place of refuge. 
This is probably because she wrote this in April 1902, at the end of the Second Anglo-Boer War when 
the fate of the Boer republics was already sealed. This meant that the perceived place of refuge did 
not exist anymore and might therefore be absent from her pessimistic view. 
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Dutch advantages from the Second Anglo-Boer War 
It is important to keep in mind that Wilhelmina was well aware of the impact the Boer War had had 
on Dutch society. As discussed before, the divided Dutch society was now united in supporting the 
Boers. Wilhelmina wrote in her journal on April 1st 1902: “A good consequence of the war for us was 
that it created unity; the people were feeling one due to the common interest in the Boers.”63 
Because Wilhelmina was very aware of the impact the Anglo-Boer War had on Dutch society, it might 
be the case that she took advantage of the situation to maintain or increase her own popularity. 
However, it seems more likely that Wilhelmina acted out of compassion, within limits so that the 
international interests and relations of the Netherlands were not impaired, rather than personal 
gain. This opinion is supported by a related event that took place after the Boer War. On July the 14th 
1904, Paul Kruger died in Clarens, Switzerland. Shortly after his death, the Dutch cabinet expressed 
the idea of providing a warship to transfer Kruger’s remains to South Africa. After informing Kruger’s 
relatives, and receiving a positive answer from them, it was decided to consult Wilhelmina. The 
Queen refused, as Kruger was no longer a head of state and there was no sign that the transport of 
his remains were threatened by molestation of any kind.64 A second attempt was taken on July 27th 
by the Minister of Water Management De Marez Oyens (1845-1911). Again, Wilhelmina refused the 
proposition, as the cabinet should first contact the British government to see if they would not take 
offense by the offer. In a letter to the (by then) Minister of Foreign Affairs Melvil van Lynden (1843-
1910), informing him about Wilhelmina’s response, Oyens quoted the Queen: “I am just considering 
things from a merchant's perspective. The proposed transport cannot bring us an asset, and thus, 
when the chances of harm are not removed, then I have to maintain my position.”65 Wilhelmina 
expected that the relationship between Great Britain and the Netherlands would deteriorate by this 
action, a relationship that was starting to improve again.66 This statement is representative of 
Wilhelmina’s whole approach throughout the Second Anglo-Boer War. 
 Wilhelmina’s view on the relationship between the Netherlands and the Boer republics was 
therefore not very different from the general opinion of the Dutch population. She perceived the 
relation from a kinship perspective. However, she also saw the struggle of the Boers as an essential 
war for the protection of the rights of small nations. Although pessimistic, Wilhelmina did not state 
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that she perceived a New Holland as a colony, nor as place of refuge; just as a precedent for the 
future, which could have consequences for the Netherlands.  
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Dutch support 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Netherlands were supporting the Boer cause because 
of the idea of kinship, rising nationalism and a new desire to become a colonial power. How the 
Dutch public supported the Boers has already been researched by Martin Bossenbroek in his book 
Holland op zijn breedst. While Bossenbroek did discuss the Dutch government’s actions, he did not 
take account of Wilhelmina’s influence. This chapter will therefore analyse how the Dutch 
government supported the Boers, focusing primarily on Wilhelmina’s role and perspective. 
 
The First Hague peace conference 
In 1899 the Russian Tsar Nicholas II (1868-1918) wanted to organise a peace conference to agree on 
the methods of war. As peace conferences are delicate diplomatic affairs, they tend not to be held on 
the territory of one of the major powers. A location for the peace conference was searched for, and 
countries such as Denmark and Belgium were named as possible host countries. However, the 
Netherlands was asked to host the conference. Wilhelmina, who did not see the use of a peace 
conference, found this a “doubtful honour” for two reasons. Foremost, Wilhelmina felt that by being 
asked to host the conference, the Netherlands were marked as a mediocre, insignificant state.67 As 
stated before, the Netherlands were still longing for the heydays of the Dutch Golden Age. 
Wilhelmina was now confronted with the current international position of the Netherlands. 
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However, in contrast to Wilhelmina’s vision of the Netherlands being marked as an insignificant 
state, the Dutch population was thrilled by the news. Wilhelmina writes: “Great was the joy of the 
public when it heard of these plans; the feeling of self-satisfaction of the people was thereby of 
course greatly caressed.”68 Secondly, Wilhelmina was very much aware of the potential problems 
surrounding the organisation of such a conference - inviting the nations. The invitation for the Holy 
See, but more importantly for this research, the invitation for the Boer republics became 
problematic.  
Throughout the preparation of the conference, it was not completely clear who was 
responsible for the invitations, and therefore who had the right to invite certain nations. The 
problems started when Van der Hoeven, the Secretary-General of the South African Republic’s 
embassy in the Netherlands, contacted de Beaufort on whether his government could expect an 
invitation. Apparently, the Russian Count Mouravieff (1845-1900), who was assigned by the Russian 
government to supervise the organisation of the conference, had given him some hope. De Beaufort 
had advised Van der Hoeven to contact Mouravieff whom, at least at that stage, he deemed 
ultimately responsible for the invitation policy.69 De Beaufort hurried to instruct the Dutch 
ambassador to Russia Van Stoetwegen, to promote that the list of invitations, if not composed by 
Russia alone, should be prepared in joint consultation, but under no circumstances with 
responsibility to be borne by the Netherlands exclusively.70 
On February 21st, the Dutch ambassador to Germany, Van Tets van Goudriaan, sent a 
message from Berlin that the German ministry had been alarmed by the news received through its 
embassy in The Hague, that De Beaufort intended to send a formal invitation to the South African 
Republic. The German government anticipated serious problems with the British on this point. It 
therefore advised De Beaufort not to take any such steps before contacting London. The next day, De 
Beaufort sent word to his ambassador that Mouravieff and himself were in agreement that Great 
Britain would never tolerate the presence of the Transvaal or the Orange Free State at the 
conference.71 
That same day, at his weekly reception of ambassadors, De Beaufort had a long interview 
with the British ambassador Howard. Despite De Beaufort’s efforts to direct the conversation to the 
subject of what the British opinion was on a possible invitation for the Boer republics, the British 
ambassador did not refer to the Boer republics during this conversation. De Beaufort concluded that 
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British policy was aimed at a confrontation: having the Boer republics invited first, only then to 
oppose their invitation and by doing so, publically embarrass the Boer republics. De Beaufort 
concluded that the best thing to do was persuade the Boer republics to decline an invitation in 
advance, just as Brazil and the Sultan of Morocco had already done.72  
 On the 28 February, De Beaufort once more contacted Van Stoetwegen. De Beaufort 
declared that it was better not to invite the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Any request from 
Pretoria should be countered by stipulating that no African state was being invited and that no 
exception was made.73 Later, on March 16th, De Beaufort contacted Van Tets on the matter. 
Ambassador Howard had come over to the ministry to confide that the British government did not 
acknowledge the diplomatic status of the Transvaal minister.74 Finally, on March 24th, a first official 
letter came in from a Boer republic. Van Boeschoten, chargé d’affaires of the South African Legation 
in Brussels, sent a response. He confirmed the interest of his government in the peace conference 
and anticipated that invitations would be dispatched any day now, and would indeed emanate from 
De Beaufort. The next day, De Beaufort sent a formal reply in which he stated that he had reasons to 
believe that the Russian government did not intended to address an invitation to any African state.75  
 The Dutch newspapers received the news by criticizing the Dutch government for letting its 
kinsmen down. The parliament convened to discuss the issue. De Beaufort had sold out the Boers. He 
received insulting letters which declared him to be a traitor and a weakling and insisted on his 
resignation. Also, Queen Wilhelmina called him a “weakling” for not inviting the Boers.76 Although 
Queen Wilhelmina blamed de Beaufort and Mouravieff for the problems regarding the Boer 
republics, one should not forget that the Netherlands, over the past half-century, as the reverse side 
of her policy of the strictest neutrality, inevitably had somewhat lost her touch with the delicate 
manoeuvres that power politics needs. 
Wilhelmina looked back on the peace conference in one of her journals, stating that nobody 
was nor could be aware of the damage that was done by not inviting the Boer republics.77 The 
conference was held only months before hostilities in South Africa began. It was Wilhelmina’s 
opinion that if the Boer republics were invited, the Second Anglo-Boer War could have been avoided 
or contained to some extent.   
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The Gelderland 
One of the most famous events during the Second Anglo-Boer War, in which the Netherlands played 
an important role, was the sending of the ironclad H. M. Gelderland. By September 1900, most of the 
conventional forces of the two Boer republics were defeated. The Boer conventional forces that were 
still fighting often had to fight against an overwhelmingly large number of British troops. Kruger was 
therefore not able to have an army to protect him, and was constantly on the move to keep out of 
British hands.  
At that time, Kruger resided at Waterval-Onder. But the British broke through during the 
Battle of Dalmanutha, where the Boer forces under general Botha were not able to stop the 
overwhelming number of British forces.78 The war was brought too close for comfort, as the British 
were now able to march to Waterval-Boven, which was linked by a tunnel to Waterval-Onder. Kruger 
had to move from Waterval-Onder to Nelspruit. As the British continued their approach without 
much resistance, now to Nelspruit, it was decided to bring Kruger to the capital of the Portuguese 
colony of Moçambique, Lourenço Marques. From there, he would travel to Europe in order to raise 
support for the Boers, but also to rest due to his weak health. Officially, Kruger had been granted six 
months’ leave in order to promote the Boer cause in Europe.79  
A train took Kruger across the border to Lourenço Marques. It did not stop at the train 
station, but shunted onto a siding, where he could reach the house of the Transvaal and Dutch 
Consul General Gerhard Pott under the cover of darkness. There, Kruger waited to board the first 
outgoing ship, which was the Herzog of the German East Africa Line.80 However, as a high-profile 
individual, Kruger’s every move was followed by interested parties. 
Despite being a Portuguese colony, the real governor was the British Consul General Crowe. 
Portugal was heavily reliant on Great Britain for financial backing.81 The Dutch consul to Lisbon, W.M. 
van Weede van Berencamp, thought there was another reason for Portugal’s cooperation with the 
British. In a letter to De Beaufort on September 19th, 1900, the consul expressed the feeling that 
Portugal’s collaboration with the British was a result of the fear that the British would annex 
Moçambique if they would not cooperate with them.82 The British pressured the Portuguese 
Governor Antonio José de Souza Machado to deal with the situation. He asked Kruger the next 
morning after his arrival to accompany him right away, as he was to be the guest of the Portuguese 
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government.83 However, Kruger became a virtual prisoner in the Governor’s residence. He was no 
longer allowed to get visits from Boers in Lourenço Marques, nor from members of his own escort.84  
Rumours of Kruger’s desire to travel to Europe, as his health prevented him taking part in the 
conflict, reached Europe. The Dutch government wanted to provide a ship for his voyage. However, 
the Dutch Royal Navy ship Friesland that was stationed at Lourenço Marquez to support and remove 
Dutch refugees, had just set sail for the Dutch Indies. Another ship, the Gelderland, was located in 
the Red Sea on its way to the Dutch Indies from the Netherlands, and received orders to sail for 
Lourenço Marquez to pick up Kruger.85 Why Governor de Souza Machado kept Kruger imprisoned but 
then let him go on the Gelderland is not clear. Wilhelmina wrote: “Although I am not familiar with 
the particulars that happened to him (Ed. Kruger), I do have a strong feeling that Portugal negotiated 
with the British government, if the latter wished to have Kruger, and if the Governor of L. M. (Ed. 
Lourenço Marques) had to extradite him.”86 This theory was also believed by Van Weede. In a letter 
to De Beaufort of September 16th, Van Weede reported a meeting he had with the Portuguese 
minister of foreign affairs João Marcellino Arroyo about Kruger’s arrival in Lourenço Marques and his 
desire to take the Herzog to Europe. Van Weede believed that one could add “if England allows”.87 
Despite these suspicions, there are no sources to support this theory. 
According to Johannes Meintjes, author of Kruger’s biography, it was Queen Wilhelmina who 
spontaneously began diplomatic moves to rescue Kruger.88 She received the approval of Queen 
Victoria to send the Gelderland to pick up Kruger. Kruger boarded the ship on the 19th of October 
1900, and the ship set sail on the 20th. Although the sending of the Gelderland was surrounded by an 
air of victory and seemed a hazardously spontaneous act, the reality is far from that. It was a well-
calculated action, with the British and Portuguese governments informed. Furthermore, the role that 
Queen Wilhelmina played in the whole affair might not be as clear and as important as Meintjes 
suggests in his biography. 
It has often been thought, as expressed in Kruger’s biography by Meintjes, that Queen 
Wilhelmina played an important role in the sending of the Gelderland. It was Wilhelmina who got 
Queen Victoria’s permission, and it was Wilhelmina who “with marvellous tact and diplomacy 
arranged everything”.89 However, it seems that Meintjes mixes the symbolic power and position of 
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Wilhelmina within the constitutional monarchy, with the power and position of the Dutch 
government, who acts in the name of the Queen, because Wilhelmina’s role was generally rather 
small.  
The idea of sending a ship did not come from Wilhelmina, but from the Minister of Navy, J.A. 
Röell. The Dutch public was getting more and more frustrated that the government was not doing 
anything actively in support of the Boers. It was the belief of the prime minister Pierson and the 
minister of Foreign Affairs De Beaufort that something had to be done to ease this tension. Röell 
proposed the idea to send the Gelderland to pick up Kruger.90  
Also, within the correspondence in preparation of sending the Gelderland, Wilhelmina’s 
name is mentioned only once, in a telegram to the Dutch representatives for Portugal, Great-Britain 
and Lourenço Marquez, who had to inform the respective governments. The telegram, sent on the 
15th September 1900 by De Beaufort, states: “As a result of the orders of Her Majesty the Queen, I 
have the honour to inform Your Excellency that Her Majesty grants permission to offer to the Sir 
President of the South African Republic a warship for his trip to the Netherlands.”91  
In one of her journals, Wilhelmina states that she only approved the proposed idea of 
sending the Gelderland.92 This would be in line with another similar event discussed earlier in this 
work. The returning of Kruger’s remains in 1904 shows similarities with the sending of the 
Gelderland. The idea came from a minister and was proposed to Wilhelmina. The only exception is 
that Wilhelmina saw no risk or disadvantages for the Netherlands, and allowed the action. The fact 
that Wilhelmina gave only her approval in the matter corresponds with what Wilhelmina wrote in 
her journal and is not very surprising. The queen is the only one with special authority to authorise 
the use of a warship.93   
The impression that the sending of the Gelderland seemed a risky, spontaneous act is also 
incorrect. Diplomatic preparations started on September 15th in 1900. An offer for providing the 
Gelderland from the Dutch government was sent on September 15th to Kruger. The next day, 
although it was not yet clear if Kruger accepted the offer, a telegram was sent to the Portuguese and 
British authorities notifying them that a Dutch ship was offered to Kruger to bring him to the 
Netherlands. As will be discussed later, we know from De Beaufort’s diary that the British consul in 
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The Hague, Howard, was already informed on the 15th. He came to visit De Beaufort the next day on 
the 16th.94 On the 17th, Kruger accepted the offer and asked when he could expect the arrival of the 
ship. Although Howard had already informed De Beaufort about British opinion on the 16th, the 
official telegram came on the 19th. The British government stated, “it does not concern Her Majesty’s 
Victoria’s Government, having neither the wish nor the power to interfere with Mr. Kruger’s 
departure nor with the ship which he may elect”.95  
The preparations for the Gelderland itself started on September 16th 1900, when the 
Commander of the Gelderland received the message that he had to remain in the port of Perim, 
where the ship was located at the time. On the 19th the ship was ordered to get a hold of the 
necessary nautical maps for its destination. These maps were acquired on the 22nd of September. 
However, that same day De Beaufort sent to the Dutch consul in Lourenço Marquez the message 
that the Gelderland could not arrive before October 10th. De Beaufort does not elaborate on the 
reasons for this delay. It is possible that the scarcity of coals at Lourenço Marquez was the gating 
issue. The Gelderland needed 500 tons of coal for its return voyage. From the 22nd of September until 
the 5th of October, Dutch authorities were trying to arrange the acquisition of the coal. Eventually, it 
was agreed on October 5th with the French government that the Netherlands would buy the coal 
from the reserves in the port of Djibouti for 65 francs per tonnage, but with the limitation that there 
should be no interaction between the ship and the shore.96  
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These letters, telegrams and other correspondences show that the event was well organised 
and consulted. Despite being less romantic as thought, it does not compromise the symbolic meaning 
of the event. It shows not only that the Boers did have support in Europe, but also that they were 
willing to act on it.  
The risk of the whole affair was also very low because of the estimated results it would have. 
The sending of the Gelderland was a win-win situation for all parties involved (the Netherlands, the 
Boers and Great Britain). For the British, the Gelderland meant a solution of what to do with Paul 
Kruger. With Kruger technically imprisoned in Lourenço Marques, it was just a matter of transferring 
him to a British prison and giving him a trial. However, capturing and eventually prosecuting Kruger 
would not mean the end of the war. It would probably provoke and infuriate the Boers and pro-Boer 
European countries even more, with a possible escalation of the conflict and the involvement of 
European forces. Therefore, having Kruger in captivity would prolong the Boer War and harm the 
British goal to conquer and pacify South Africa quickly. Meanwhile, for the Boers, the Gelderland 
meant that Paul Kruger could continue his fight from Europe and be out of danger. Being in Europe 
made it easier for him to visit nations and their governments that were in favour of the Boers, to ask 
for funds, weapons, mediation or even military intervention to support the war efforts. But more 
importantly, the Boer leader remained free, which was again symbolically important to keep the Boer 
moral high. 
Image 7. Paul Kruger and the crew of the 'Gelderland', on-board the ship. 
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For the Dutch, the sending of the Gelderland was the long awaited act of support. The Dutch 
public had felt that the government was not doing enough to support the Boers.97 They wanted 
action, rather than the passive words of support that were often heard from the government and 
read in the newspapers. Wilhelmina states in her journal: “It speaks for itself that the general public 
thought of the government as lax and would have liked nothing more than it ceding for the good 
cause; the government did not fulfil that desire in their hearts (…). Now finally came the deed which 
the people so desired.” 98 It was also a welcome “success” for the Dutch government. After months 
of insults by the public, but also by the political opposition, they finally received some positive 
support.  
The possible negative result for the Anglo-Dutch relations, by offering the Gelderland, were 
estimated by the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs De Beaufort to be negligible. Kruger’s voyage was 
on medical grounds, not political, and Kruger would pass his position as president to Schalk Burger, 
making Kruger a “normal” individual. The British authorities could not take offence by this simple act. 
Fasseur writes in his book Wilhelmina: The young queen that De Beaufort had made sure he had the 
secret approval of the British for offering the Gelderland to Kruger.99 This is not surprising, as we 
have seen throughout this research that the Dutch government did everything they could to keep 
from deteriorating the Dutch-Anglo relations any further. Also, when the Dutch cabinet wanted to 
offer a Dutch naval vessel to repatriate Kruger’s remains in 1904, Wilhelmina demanded that the 
cabinet should first contact the British government, to make sure they would not take offense by the 
offer. 
 However, there are reasons to doubt Fasseur’s statement. Fasseur does not provide a 
source for his statement, nor can we find any similar statement in the published diaries of De 
Beaufort by de Valk and van Faassen or archival sources. In the diaries of De Beaufort, we can even 
find a statement that proves the opposite. De Beaufort writes: “Immediately after the offer (Ed. the 
offer of the Gelderland to Kruger) was made I had my secretary-general Mr. Ruyssenaers send to the 
English ambassador to inform him. I did not want to consult them in advance”.100 De Beaufort did not 
want to inform the British authorities before the offer had been made because it would pose an 
opportunity for the British to express their disagreement in advance. If the Dutch government 
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continued their effort despite the expressed British opinion, the action could then be perceived as 
hostile or unfriendly and posing a possible risk for the Anglo-Dutch relations.101 
On top of that, the British government were very much aware of the motivation behind the 
offer of the Gelderland. After informing Sir Henry Howard, the British ambassador in The Hague, 
Howard came the next morning to De Beaufort. Howard told De Beaufort that England would have 
preferred that the offer was not made at all, but that no offence was taken. He understood very well 
that the offer was made for the Netherlands, and specifically to ease the Dutch public opinion. 
Howard said: “It will do you a lot of good here”.102 
 
Marseille instead of the Netherlands 
There is still another question that arises: Why was Kruger brought to Marseille in France and not to 
a city in the Netherlands? As it was a Dutch action, it would be logical to bring Kruger to the 
Netherlands where the Dutch nationals could celebrate the whole action. Although it was stated 
earlier that the ship would bring Kruger to the Netherlands, in a telegram from De Beaufort to the 
Dutch consul in Lourenço Marquez on the 22nd of September, it was stated that Kruger was 
transported to “any European port”.103   
According to Meintjes, the Gelderland was not to take Kruger through British waters. 
Meintjes does not provide a source for this information nor any motivation.104 Although it seems 
logical that contact with British held territories should be avoided (as previously seen with the 
replenishment of the coal supply of the Gelderland), it was probably not a requirement for the 
journey, as the Gelderland visited the harbour of Port-Said in Egypt anyhow.  
However, we do know that a voyage to the Netherlands would take much longer. If the 
Gelderland wanted to reach the Netherlands, it had to sail either around the Cape of Good Hope and 
western Africa or through the Mediterranean and the Strait of Gibraltar. In the same telegram from 
September 22nd, De Beaufort himself suggests a Mediterranean port because the Atlantic was very 
rough. The questionable health of Kruger might have influenced the decision to shorten his time at 
sea, so he would receive care more quickly.      
Another reason might be found in the archives. The Dutch National Archive in The Hague 
holds a specific map containing all the documents regarding the sending of the Gelderland. These 
documents are all diplomatic correspondences between Dutch representatives of the government 
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and representatives of involved nations. However, one document was a letter from the director of 
the Assurantie-Maatschappij tegen brandschade “de Nederlanden” (Insurance Company against 
damage by fire “the Netherlands”) on September 28th 1900.105 This document is remarkable as it is 
the only document from a private company that is included in the map. In this letter, the director 
expresses his understanding for sending the Gelderland, but moreover expresses their fear of British 
retaliation for the action of the Dutch government. The retrieval of Kruger to the Netherlands would 
spark anti-British demonstrations. In reaction to these demonstrations, it is the fear of the director 
that the British will boycott Dutch products and businesses. He therefore suggests to bring Kruger to 
Marseille.106  
It is impossible that this letter 
had influenced De Beaufort, as he 
already suggested in the telegram 
from the 22nd of September sending 
the Gelderland to a Mediterranean 
port. However, this letter might have 
enforced the conviction of the Dutch 
government to bring Kruger ashore in 
a Mediterranean port, and as a result, 
they might have tried to persuade 
Kruger or Leyds into this decision. 
Kruger would express his desired 
destination (Marseille) in a telegram on the 24th of October, almost a month later.107 In the 
meantime, Leyds had arranged with the French government the most ideal place of arrival from 
where Kruger could start his European mission.108 However, there are no documents that confirm the 
influence of the letter.  
Despite no evidence of its influence on Dutch policy, the letter of the Insurance Company 
“The Netherlands” might contain the same fears that existed amongst the Dutch government 
regarding bringing Kruger to the Netherlands. If Kruger debarked in the Netherlands, it would 
probably have resulted in festivities and demonstrations (as seen in Marseille), which could harm the 
Anglo-Dutch relations. As stated before, the Dutch government was very jumpy about every public 
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Image 8. The 'Gelderland' in the port of Marseille. 
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expression of pro-Boer sentiments. The Dutch government therefore tried to distance themselves 
from any pro-Boer expressions in relation to Kruger’s voyage, as they regarded the offer of the 
Gelderland as a personal not a diplomatic action.   
To enforce that idea, De Beaufort and Leyds had agreed during an exchange of letters on 
October 24th that Kruger was not allowed to receive anyone while on the ship. This was to prevent 
the suspicion that Kruger still gave orders and functioned as the president, where the Gelderland 
functioned as his safe house. Kruger not meeting anyone safeguarded that the offer of 
transportation via a Dutch Royal Navy ship offered by the Netherlands was used by the individual 
Kruger as intended, not to further his position as the president of the South African Republic which 
could offend the British.109 In this same letter, De Beaufort defines the conduct of behaviour for the 
Gelderland and its crew as well. Kruger would be picked up from the Gelderland by a barge, only 
accompanied by his fellow travellers from South Africa. De Beaufort adds: “Still it does seem to me 
that all the reasons exist for the ship with President Kruger on board to leave Marseille again as soon 
as possible. Festivities in honour of Sir Kruger will likely not fail to appear at Marseille and it seems to 
me considering our international ligatures has to be avoided because the crew of the Gelderland 
could get 
involved with 
the 
festivities.”110   
In 
preparation of 
Kruger’s arrival 
at Marseille, the 
Dutch consul to 
Marseille, Story 
van Blokland, 
asked De 
Beaufort for 
instructions 
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regarding his course of behaviour in a letter from November 10th. Blokland received his instructions 
two days later. He had to board the Gelderland and offer his assistance to Kruger as a particular 
person, not as the President of the South African Republic. Just as with the crew of the Gelderland, 
Blokland was not allowed to participate in any of the festivities, unless colleagues of other nations 
would participate.111 Doing so, the Netherlands protected itself from offending the British by not 
participating or by hiding behind nations who did participate and therefore following others instead 
of taking the initiative.  
 
Kruger and Boer representatives in Europe 
The Netherlands really distinguished itself from other pro-Boer European nations by how they 
welcomed the European mission of the Driemanschap (triumvirate) in April 1900, and Kruger’s arrival 
in the Netherlands in December 1900. In an attempt to increase support and funds for the Boer 
cause, three South African representatives (Fisher, Wessels and Wolmarans) went on a European and 
American mission. Upon their arrival, they requested De Beaufort for an audience with Queen 
Wilhelmina. During this time, the men asked Wilhelmina if she would request the Russian Tsar to 
receive them. The triumvirate knew that the German Emperor and Russian Tsar did not want to 
receive them. After consulting with De Beaufort, De Beaufort advised the Queen not to send a letter. 
The Russian Empress was very close with Queen Victoria. He was afraid that the letter was conveyed 
to the British, which could harm the Anglo-Dutch relation even further.112 However, after reading the 
innocent content of the letter, De Beaufort changed his mind.113 Nevertheless, they received a 
negative response from the Russian Tsar.114 
 On the 26th of April, De Beaufort had an official meeting with the Boer representatives. It was 
De Beaufort’s opinion that the Boer representatives already knew that the Dutch government would 
not do anything to help the Boers.115 However, the Boer representatives expressed their utmost 
disappointment. It was their opinion that if even the Netherlands were not going to support the 
Boers, they could already give up the war. If the Netherlands were not supporting the Boers, their 
mission to other countries would be useless.116 Nevertheless, the Boers still wanted to try to 
persuade the American government to support them.  
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 Overall, the mission of the triumvirate was a failure. They did not accomplish anything in 
France and the Netherlands, Germany and Russia did not want to receive them, and in America they 
only succeeded in getting more support from the American public, but not the government.117 
As mentioned before, Kruger came to Europe to increase and intensify European support for 
the Boer cause Kruger wanted to make a trip to the major European powers which had so far been 
pro-Boer, such as France, Germany and Russia. Although his arrival in Marseille was attended with 
great festivities, it would quickly stand in great contrast with what happened after his arrival. Kruger 
arrived on November 24th in Paris, and was warmly greeted by the Parisian inhabitants. Just as in 
Marseille, the Dutch ambassador Van Swinderen offered his services to Kruger. He also presented a 
telegram from Queen Wilhelmina. However, a transcript of this telegram was not found in the 
archives. Despite the warm welcome by the French government, Kruger did not get the active 
support for the Boers he desired. The sole small success Kruger got was that if the notification of the 
annexation of the South African Republic would be received by the French government, the French 
government would not ratify it.118  
In Paris, Kruger received a message from the Belgian government with a request to not visit 
Belgium. The British government was not amused by the acquittal of Jean-Baptiste Sipido (1884-
1959). Sipido had tried to assassinate the Prince of Wales (later King Edward VII) at the Brussel-Noord 
(Brussels-North) railway station on April 5th 1900. Sipido accused the Prince of causing the slaughter 
of thousands during the Second Anglo-Boer War. Because Sipido was only 15 years old during his act, 
the court ruled that he could not be held legally responsible.119 To avoid any further escalation of 
Anglo-Belgian relations, the Belgium government asked Kruger to not visit Belgium.120  
The next stop was Germany. However, the German Emperor was not in Berlin, and did not 
know when he would be back. Despite this uncertainty, Kruger still took the train on December 1st. 
He would travel via Cologne and Magdeburg to Berlin, where he if necessary would wait for the 
Emperor. However, once in Cologne, Kruger received Sir von Tschirschky and Bögendorff, who 
informed Kruger that the Emperor would not receive Kruger and asked him not to come to Berlin.121 
Kruger, who still believed that the German Emperor would support him, was shocked by Wilhelm’s 
refusal. “The Kaiser has betrayed us,” Kruger told Leyds.122 
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On December 3rd, Leyds sent a 
telegram to De Beaufort, in which he 
informed him that Kruger wished to 
leave Cologne for The Hague. The 
Netherlands was his final destination, 
as he was going to stay there for an 
unspecified period. De Beaufort had no 
objections. Kruger would leave on 
December 6th at 10.06 am.123 For his 
arrival, schools and businesses were 
closed. Wilhelmina wrote in her 
journal about Kruger’s arrival: 
“Everyone was dressed with a 
Transvaal coloured bow, flags were waved, many interested people were present; the youth formed 
guards of honour on horseback (…)”.124 Two days later, Kruger had an audience with Wilhelmina. 
Wilhelmina did not reveal what was said during this audience, only that Kruger came with Leyds, and 
that both gentlemen came a few days later for dinner with her and her mother.125 
On December 15th, Kruger had a dinner with all the Dutch ministers, the vice-president of the 
Council of State Schorer, and some others. Everyone felt sorry for Kruger as he was traveling through 
Europe, without his wife, asking for help without being heard. Kruger was deaf and had problems 
with his eyesight, but still kept his humour. He spoke about the war and his beloved family.126 Kruger 
would eventually move to Utrecht to get treatment for his eyes and bronchitis by Professor Snellen. 
His health improved quickly and he seemed in better health, so Kruger moved back to The Hague. It 
was then decided to move to Hilversum at the beginning of April 1901 for 8 months. His health 
continued to improve so markedly that he began to give interviews again. His general appearance 
even seemed to improve. Also the health of Kruger’s wife Gezina, which caused her not to travel with 
her husband to Europe, seemed to improve.127 Kruger’s life seemed to improve in many aspects. 
After returning from a brief vacation spent visiting Dutch towns such as Scheveningen, 
Dordrecht and Rotterdam, bad news was waiting for Kruger in Hilversum. Despite her seemingly 
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improving health, Gezina had again became ill and passed away.128 A difficult time began for Kruger 
in which he lived in absolute retirement, despite an attempt by Wolmarans to bring Kruger back to 
Scheveningen to distract his thoughts. However, Kruger found joy in writing his memoirs, an initiative 
by Pieter Grobler and Manie Bredell, who felt it their moral obligation for prosperity to document 
Kruger’s life, as he was president during a very important time in South African history.129 
In December 1901, Kruger moved again to Utrecht to villa Oranjelust. After Gezina’s death, 
his daughter Elsje Eloff and her family came to the Netherlands and lived next to Kruger.130 Kruger 
was asked if he would like to move to a milder climate to ease his rheumatics, but he did not want to 
have luxuries while his country and his people were still suffering. Kruger’s health started to decline 
again, as he became more deaf and blind.131  
The first months of 1902 were very interesting times for Kruger. Lord Kitchener started 
overtures for peace negotiations. On May 31st 1902, the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed, officially 
ending the Second Anglo-Boer War. Kruger still had difficulties believing that this was the end of his 
beloved Transvaal and Orange Free State, as long as the flags were still flying in front of his house. 
Bredell had them removed at sunset on June 14th, two weeks after the signing of the treaty.132 After 
that realisation, Kruger again became increasingly solitary. He would go to Montene on the French 
Riviera in the summer of 1902 and 1903, together with the Eloff family, for his bronchitis and 
rheumatics. Kruger found it comforting that they were around, but did not need the interaction 
itself.133   
At the beginning of summer 1904, Kruger moved to Clarence in Switzerland, again 
accompanied by the Eloff family. His health was constantly degrading. He was likely no longer able to 
enjoy the beautiful Swiss Alps. He was now almost completely blind and deaf, and Kruger was not 
able to move around without support. Kruger’s body was tired and fragile, as became clear on July 
9th. Kruger contracted pneumonia and died eventually on July 14th 1904.134   
The fact that Kruger lived and died outside his beloved South Africa was due to a personal 
decision. Even after the war, Kruger decided to remain in Europe. There were many reasons for 
Kruger to stay in Europe.135 Although his farm Boekenhoutfontein, despite being slightly damaged, 
was still standing, it did not seem right for Kruger to return to his home. Not while the homes of 
many Boers, including those of close friends and family, were gone. Also, Kruger refused to die under 
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British rule, nor being a subject of the British Empire. It would also be impossible for Kruger to stay at 
Boekenhoutfontein without interfering in South African politics, which would only cause problems in 
his opinion.136 Before a final decision was made, Kruger wanted to discuss the matter with generals 
Botha, De la Rey and De Wet, who were on their way to Europe to raise funds for their stricken 
people. He met them on August 20th 1902.137 
A decision on Kruger’s exile was made - he would not return to South Africa. Besides Kruger’s 
own motivations, the Boer generals also had political reasons to support Kruger’s desire to remain in 
Europe. The concept of an old man who was forced into exile could be used as a fundamental story 
within the Afrikaner identity. Kruger would become a martyr around whom myths could be woven, a 
symbol of the Afrikaner identity in itself. His mind found satisfaction in being sacrificed for this 
cause.138 Although a peace treaty was signed, for many Afrikaners, the war was not over, and for 
some it is still not over to this day. The desire to protect the Afrikaner identity or re-found the Boer 
Republics would persist along with these myths. To enforce these myths however, it was necessary 
that Kruger remained in exile.139 
 
Secret activities 
As previously mentioned, Wilhelmina had an audience with Marez Oyens on July 27th regarding the 
repatriation of Kruger’s remains. During this meeting, Wilhelmina stated: “(…) but I have done more 
for the Boers than my fellow countrymen will ever know (…).”140 With this statement, Wilhelmina 
suggests that she did more than what was known. She might have suggested the sending of letters to 
Queen Victoria, the Russian Tsar and German Empire, which will be discussed in the following 
chapter. However, she might be referring to another secret activity. In her journal, Wilhelmina refers 
to a conversation she had with De Beaufort, where she asked if she could do something to help the 
Boers. Apparently, the Netherlands were already helping, but Wilhelmina was kept in the dark about 
it. The German government provided the Boers with intelligence and advice. Because the Germans 
did not want to cause any British suspicion, the German ambassador in The Hague gave the messages 
to De Beaufort. In his turn, De Beaufort used the Dutch secret code to message the reports to the 
Dutch Consul in Pretoria, who again transferred them to Kruger.141  
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 This was done throughout the war. In the end it became necessary, as Kruger now resided in 
The Hague and later in Utrecht. During peace negotiations between Boer Commander J.C. Smuts and 
Lord Kitchener on June 1st 1901, the Dutch ambassador wired the reports to Kruger.142 
 In Fasseur’s biography about Wilhelmina, a small paragraph is dedicated to this matter. 
Fasseur states that it bothered Wilhelmina that she was not informed about the German 
telegrams.143 He refers to one of Wilhelmina’s self-written journals from April 1st 1902 as a source. In 
this journal, Wilhelmina states the reasons why the messages were sent via the Netherlands and 
what the German messages contained in general. However, Wilhelmina does not say if it bothered 
her that she was not kept informed. She wrote: “I had initially been left unaware of this matter by 
Beaufort and later, when it was looked into whether I could do something for the good cause, he 
showed me the exchanged telegrams.”144 It seems that Fasseur was trying to exaggerate quite a 
normal statement, as Fasseur also adds an exclamation mark at the end of another normal statement 
regarding the telegrams.  
 
Boer refugees 
As in every war, people will flee the country. Some were even exiled by the British government. As 
many inhabitants of the Boer republics had some connections with the Netherlands, many sought 
asylum there. Some were housed in the Afrikaner Tehuis (Afrikaner shelter), located at the Nieuwe 
Herengracht in Amsterdam. Many of the inhabitants were Boers from the Cape Colony, who joined 
the Boer forces and could not return home as they were considered rebels by the British, which was 
punishable by the death penalty. The Dutch public showed their sympathy for them. Also, 
Wilhelmina came to visit them and to personally meet the people living in the shelter.145 Wilhelmina 
also made an effort to stop the repatriation or banishment of Dutchmen and Boers. After long 
consideration, and after advice from a British commissioner, the British government decided to 
reimburse these people. Although a small sum, money was paid to the Dutch government, who had 
to divide it amongst the recipients.146   
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Dutch intervention 
During the Second Anglo Boer War  the Netherlands were known for their passive support for the 
Boer cause. Discussion of active involvement in armed struggle tends to focus on the approximately 
3000 Dutch volunteers who went to the Boer republics and fought against the British. Most 
famously, however unsuccessful, is the Hollanderkorps, a unit of Dutch and Belgian volunteers. 
Although it should be noted that the Dutch volunteers were not unique, as volunteers came, for 
example, from Scandinavia, Russia, France, Ireland, Canada and the United States.   
It is unknown if Wilhelmina and the Dutch government were investigating possible ways to 
intervene, either with force or at a diplomatic level. This chapter will therefore discuss the multiple 
occasions in which Wilhelmina and the Dutch government were preparing interventions with 
different characteristics.  
 
Wilhelmina and armed forces 
Queen Wilhelmina, but also Queen-regent Emma, were heavily interested and involved with the 
Dutch armed forces. They were both actively involved in the policies and doctrines of the army, 
especially in regard to the Aceh War. They were outspoken supporters of a hard, expansive policy in 
Aceh, and therefore very passionate about the Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger (Royal 
Netherlands East-Indies Army (KNIL)).147 One of the first things Wilhelmina did when she became 
queen was to reorganise the armed forces.148  
As discussed in the previous chapter, Wilhelmina was not in favour of the peace conference. 
Besides her previously mentioned reasons, Wilhelmina did simply not believe in, as she described, 
“childish utopia”. Wilhelmina wrote: “Who would ever disarm? Certainly not those who to great 
effort had increased their defensibility! Furthermore I had plans for reorganizing our armed forces; 
saving what was left to save of the army, to slowly bring our troops to that point where it is properly 
useable in times of war; how the plans for the disarmament ran against it!”149 
 Since the outbreak of war, Queen Wilhelmina was very interested in the military 
organisation, capabilities and odds of both the British and Boer armies. In November 1899 she made 
a list of the military/tactical advantages and disadvantages for the Boers and British troops. For 
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example, she points out that the Boers have the knowledge of the terrain and are used to the South 
African climate but have limited resources and troops. About the British, she remarks that they are 
well disciplined but lack the sympathy of the population from the occupied territories and have to 
endure long transports over sea for resources.150 This shows that Wilhelmina was well aware of the 
advantages and disadvantages of both parties, but moreover how they affected the conduct of the 
war. 
 
Intervening with force 
In the Royal House Archive, one specific document, only consisting of four phrases, proves that 
Queen Wilhelmina was seriously considering intervention with force in South Africa. On September 
23rd 1899, De Beaufort wrote this letter:  
 
“Advising Wilhelmina 
- The army is in bad condition 
- England is too strong 
For the time being it is not in the Netherlands interest nor in the interest of the South African 
Republic.”151 
 
It is not clear why De Beaufort sent this message to Wilhelmina, and no documents referring to this 
case were found in the National Archives. It seems most likely that Wilhelmina asked De Beaufort for 
the possibilities, but without the other letter, we can only guess. What De Beaufort also did not 
mention is that the Dutch armed forces were probably already weakened, as the Netherlands were 
fighting the Aceh War. To some extent, most of the weight was carried by the KNIL, but the regular 
army and navy were also involved in the conflict. Overall, this meant that a lot of the resources were 
already engaged in hostilities. This would presumably also have an effect on the Dutch possibilities to 
intervene with force.  
It is clear that this is an important document, in relation to what Wilhelmina did or was 
thinking of doing. It seems as though Wilhelmina is hinting at active military intervention. However, 
there are some problems regarding the interpretation of this document. It seems that De Beaufort 
wrote this letter as a response to a letter from Wilhelmina. Despite further research in the Royal 
House Archive and the National Archive, no letter from Wilhelmina or any letter relating to this 
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subject was found. Therefore, we do not have the context the letter was written in, and it is 
therefore impossible to know the exact meaning and seriousness of the letter. 
A more problematic issue is that on a second visit to the Royal House Archive, this document 
was no longer included in the previously consulted documents, and it was not found again. This 
research was therefore not in the position to consult the document again to verify if the document 
was transcribed properly. It is still unclear what happened to this document.  
 
Creating a coalition  
Wilhelmina was aware that if she wanted to act, she could not do it alone. Throughout the conflict, 
Wilhelmina stayed in close contact with specifically the Russian Tsar and the German Emperor, two 
of the major powers in Europe.  
In the same document of November 1899 in which she describes the advantages and 
disadvantages of the Boer and British troops, she also estimates how the major European powers are 
going to react.152 But it seems that Wilhelmina is estimating who she could form a coalition with. 
Wilhelmina describes France, Germany, Russia and the United States. She states that despite the fact 
that French had not forgotten about Fashoda (in 1898, an armed confrontation between armies of 
France and Great Britain was just avoided) the internal affairs and the lack of ships made the French 
powerless. For every nation, the lack of ships was a problem, and therefore no one could really harm 
the British at sea.153  
Although the Germans were pro-Boers, the German government and emperor followed to 
some extent the same policy as the Netherlands. They would support the Boer republics, without 
harming their relationship with Great Britain. The relationship between Germany and Great Britain 
had improved in recent years. Also, there was a “secret” treaty between the nations about dividing 
Portuguese colonies. The possibility of increasing their territory even more limited the commitment 
of Germany. 
Wilhelmina believed that Russia was the best candidate to do something against Great 
Britain. She believed that Russia could harm Britain in Asia. Given any opportunity, Russia would not 
ignore a chance to increase their territory in Asia, especially as Britain had interests in Persia, 
Afghanistan and China. However, it seemed that Russia would remain neutral in the conflict. 
The United States were not regarded as a possible ally against the British. It was Wilhelmina’s 
opinion that the political policies of the United States were too inconsistent for the time being, as 
there were upcoming elections. However, if they would threaten Great Britain it might perhaps have 
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a positive result, as Britain had many commercial dealings with the United States, and the fact that it 
shared a border with Canada meant that they had to remain on good terms. 
 
Preventing war 
Willem Johannes Leyds, a Dutchmen who made a career in the government of the South African 
Republic and who eventually became a special ambassador of the South African Republic, expressed 
the idea that Queen Wilhelmina could write a letter to Queen Victoria. Leyds maintained a friendly 
correspondence from mid-July until September 1899 with his former teacher and friend J.P. Moltzer, 
a member of the Council of State. Moltzer, who supported the Boer cause, wrote that if Leyds knew 
something that the Dutch government could do to avoid a war between the Boer republics and Great 
Britain, he should let him know.154 In a letter to Pretoria on August 8th 1899, Leyds wrote that he had 
a meeting with prime minister Pierson, also a former teacher of Leyds, and minister of Foreign Affairs 
De Beaufort. During this meeting, Leyds suggested that Queen Wilhelmina could write a letter to 
convince Victoria to avoid a war at all costs.155 However, Pierson and De Beaufort refused the 
suggestion. According to Pierson, a request from Queen Wilhelmina, still very young and at the 
beginning of her career, to Queen Victoria, an old lady at the end of her career, was too risky. He did 
not want to expose Wilhelmina to such a risk. He said, also in the name of De Beaufort, that from the 
Dutch government nothing could be expected. Wilhelmina was kept unaware of the whole 
situation.156    
 However, De Beaufort changed his mind when he received a letter from the British historian 
Frederic Harrison. In this letter, Harrison stated that a war between Great Britain and the South 
African Republic was imminent. Harrison was opposed to a possible war and was trying to turn British 
opinion against a conflict with the South African Republic. Harrison asked Wilhelmina if she would 
like to write a personal and private letter to Queen Victoria.157 At that time, the Dutch government 
had refrained from any interference regarding the tensions between Great Britain and the South 
African Republic. De Beaufort stated that it was the government’s desire to continue this policy. 
However, a letter as proposed by Harrison would be acceptable. On September 6th 1899, De Beaufort 
sent a letter to Queen Wilhelmina, informing her about Harrison’s letter. Wilhelmina should decide 
for herself if she would like to write such a letter. If she wanted to write one, De Beaufort would have 
no objections.158 
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 Wilhelmina decided to write a letter to Queen Victoria, in which she emphasised the misery a 
possible war would bring, including to the British side.159 The letter Wilhelmina wrote were solely her 
words. De Beaufort did not proofread the letter, as Wilhelmina purposefully gave him the draft of the 
letter after sending it. However, Victoria’s response was as Wilhelmina expected it: “The Queen 
could not do anything, the matter depended on Kruger’s attitude.”160 
 
Mediation 
On March 9th 1900, the Dutch ambassador in Pretoria had received a message from the presidents of 
the Orange Free State and the South African Republic. In this dramatic letter, both presidents 
expressed the wish for mediation by a foreign nation in order to end the bloody conflict. The Boers 
specifically requested the intervention of the United States, France, Germany, Russia, Belgium, 
Austria, Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands.161 It is not surprising that the presidents sent the 
message at this time. The war had not gone well for the Boers. The Boer general Cronjé had been 
captured together with around 4000 of his men; the siege of Ladysmith and Kimberley had been 
broken by the British; and the Boer generals De Wet and De La Rey were fighting against an 
overwhelming British force. Also, the British persuaded the native tribes to harass the Boers, and 
Portugal now allowed the transport of war material and resources over their territory in 
Moçambique.162 
 On March 10th in the House of Lords, Lord Salisbury said that negotiations on the basis of 
independence for the Boer republics were unlikely. On the 11th, the German government had already 
sent a telegram to Pretoria in which they made it clear that Germany would like to mediate, if both 
parties would accept mediation by the Germans. However, the German government knew that the 
Boer republics demanded independence, but also that because of Lord Salisbury’s statement, 
mediation was already doomed to fail, as Great Britain would not accept the independence of the 
Boer republics.163 164  
On March 12th, De Beaufort immediately instructed the Dutch ambassadors to the addressed 
nations to let him know how the respective nations were going to react. The other countries did this 
as well.165 On March 13th, De Beaufort received the transcription of a meeting between the Dutch 
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consul in Paris, De Stuer, and the French minister of foreign affairs, Delcassé. Delcassé expressed the 
opinion that a positive result for mediation by any nation was highly doubtful because of Salisbury’s 
statement and the Boer demands of independence. It was his opinion that France was not in the 
position to initiate the mediation. He also stated that Russia was in a difficult position. As the recent 
initiators of the peace conference in The Hague, they were qualified for this intervention. However, 
their seemingly neutral position was affected by Russia’s interest in Asia. As a mediator in a conflict, 
it is necessary to be neutral and objective. Because both Great Britain and Russia had interests in 
Asia, Russia was not objective. It could use its position to direct the course of events in its favour, 
with a possible outcome of increasing its influence in Asia. It is also clear that the French government 
did not know how other governments would react (or already had reacted) on the invitation for 
mediation. In the opinion of Delcassé, Germany was the best candidate. Because of the good 
relations between Wilhelmina and Emperor Wilhelm, Delcassé suggested that Wilhelmina write a 
letter to Wilhelm to find out  the exact meaning of Germany’s offer. 166 As stated before, Delcassé 
was not informed that Germany had made an offer for mediation on the 11th, but he knew that it 
would get declined.167  
Together with De Stuers report, answers of other nations reached De Beaufort on the 13th. A 
response came from the Dutch ambassador in Saint Petersburg, who had met with Count Mouravieff. 
Mouravieff said that the timing of the request was excellent, as ten days before the Russians were 
looking for a way to help the Boers. It was also his opinion that, by including the smaller European 
nations in the request, the major powers could not watch silently. However, similar to the French, it 
was thought that Russia was not in the position to take the lead. Mouravieff suggested that the 
United States should take the lead. Great Britain had reasons to keep the United States as a friend, 
and if the United States acted first, other powers would immediately follow.168 Indeed, a more 
positive response came from Washington. In a telegram to De Beaufort, it was stated that the 
following Saturday the United States would offer their mediation if requested by Great Britain.169  
On the 14th, De Beaufort sent Lord Salisbury’s statement made on the 10th in the House of 
Lords to Wilhelmina, along with Russia’s response that it would not offer mediation. Also on the 14th, 
a British answer to the American offer came in. Lord Salisbury thanked the Americans with the 
utmost feelings of friendship, but the British government could not accept the intervention of any 
power “for the moment”. This was the start for all the other nations to decline the request of the 
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Boer republics. Russia, France and the other smaller powers gave a definite answer that they would 
not take the initiative.  
De Beaufort received Lord Salisbury’s statement on the 15th , and informed Wilhelmina that 
same day that the decisive statement of the English government made every intervention impossible, 
as “it would undoubtedly be an unfriendly act against England.”170171 Therefore, the Dutch 
government sent a telegram to its ambassador in Pretoria, saying that the Dutch government would 
not take initiative regarding the intervention, but would support any other action by another power 
that was aimed to restore peace in South Africa.172 
According to the remarks in De Beaufort’s diary, Wilhelmina was very nervous and 
disappointed by Emperor Wilhelm’s answer of rejection. He recorded in his diary that Wilhelmina 
wanted to write a letter to Tsar Nicholas, in an attempt to convince him to take the initiative instead. 
However, De Beaufort supposedly convinced the Queen to wait for new developments in Russia and 
the United States.173 
 
Wilhelmina’s letter to Kaiser Wilhelm 
 A possible reason why Wilhelmina was nervous during her conversation with De Beaufort might be 
because she had written a letter to Emperor Wilhelm on the 20th of that month, as suggested by 
Delcassé, but without the consent of De Beaufort.174 Either Wilhelmina had told De Beaufort about 
the letter during this conversation, or De Beaufort had found out by himself. Nevertheless, 
Wilhelmina had to now face De Beaufort in this light, which might explain her nervousness. In this 
letter to Kaiser Wilhelm, Wilhelmina tried to convince Wilhelm to take the initiative for mediation, 
but also to ask for advice if there was anything he or they could do together to “avert the worst for 
the Boer people.”175 
There is much discussion in the literature whether De Beaufort was informed. Wilhelmina 
writes in her journal: ”The only monarch that I knew and of whom I knew he was a supporter of the 
Boer-cause, actually the German Emperor. I wrote him private and in the utmost secrecy a letter in 
which I asked the German Emperor if he did not know a way to end the bloodshed. Before doing so, I 
discussed my intentions with De Beaufort who did not have any objections, if it was done with the 
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utmost secrecy.176 Fasseur (following Wilhelmina’s statements from her journal) writes that De 
Beaufort was informed, while Van Raalte says that he was not informed. In contrary to Fasseur, Van 
Raalte provides in his book a clear explanation why De Beaufort was likely not informed.  
The events discussed in the previous paragraphs, following Van Raalte’s book, happened in 
the period from March 9th to the 15th. De Beaufort informed Wilhelmina about the events on the 14th 
and 15th. Wilhelmina sent her letter to the German Emperor on March 20th. Lord Salisbury’s 
statement on the 15th and De Beaufort’s remarks about that statement make it highly unlikely that 
someone with the experience and knowledge of international diplomacy like De Beaufort would 
permit Wilhelmina to write such a letter five days after Lord Salisbury’s statement. Besides the 
archival evidence, De Beaufort does not mention nor refer to a letter during this period to the 
German Emperor in his published diaries. In addition, after her audience with De Beaufort, 
Wilhelmina spoke to Schorer directly after. Wilhelmina asked Schorer what was considered a 
personal letter and what was considered a political letter.177 This question can also be interpreted as: 
About what do I need to inform the minister and what can I leave out?  It is therefore more likely 
that De Beaufort was not informed, and that Wilhelmina is not telling the truth in her journal. 
Apart from the question of whether De Beaufort was informed, Wilhelmina must have been 
aware that Germany would most likely respond in a negative way, and that she took a large risk to 
get an answer which she already knew. By not informing De Beaufort, Wilhelmina had acted in 
contradiction with the Dutch constitution and it posed a danger for relations with Great Britain. 
Wilhelm had already notified King Edward VII about a Russian attempt to persuade Wilhelm to take 
an initiative for peace on March 3rd. Luckily, Wilhelmina’s correspondence remained confidential and 
without consequence.178  
Van Raalte states that the rejective letter of Kaiser Wilhelm could be interpreted as an 
admonition to Wilhelmina that the Netherlands were not armed well enough.179 However, it is the 
author’s opinion that this letter is not an admonition, as the tone is very caring, friendly, realistic and 
comforting. Wilhelm shows a very clear understanding of the international political situation at that 
time. Apart from the reasons previously mentioned why none of the nations (especially Germany) 
would take the initiative for mediation or any other kind of initiative, such as Russia’s promise not to 
use the war to increase its influence and Lord Salisbury’s statement, Wilhelm blames Kruger himself 
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for the situation his country is in. Wilhelm states in his letter: “I dare to remember you that we once 
both gave advice, which however, has not been followed”.180 During the prelude to the Second 
Anglo-Boer War, the German embassy in the Netherlands had contacted De Beaufort to persuade 
Kruger to request mediation from the United States. De Beaufort did inform Kruger, but Kruger 
dismissed this proposal. When Kruger did request the mediation of the United States during the war, 
it was already too late. After a terrible start of the war with some “humiliating” defeats, Britain now 
had to defend its international prestige and would do so at all costs. Wilhelm tried to comfort 
Wilhelmina by writing: “Although there will be much in here (the letter) that must sadden you, you 
can say with a clear conscience that your government has done timely its best to avert the current 
misfortune of the Boer people.”181 Therefore the Netherlands were not to blame in Wilhelm’s 
opinion. 
From this it appears that the European powers feared to take the initiative in light of possibly 
offending the British by the gesture. There was no clear advantage to take the initiative for any 
nation. The prospect of soured relations with Great Britain became a real danger after Lord Salisbury 
made his statement, and any effort could have resulted in harming national interests. 
   
Presenting the position of stadtholder 
An interesting document was found in the National Archives in The Hague, written by Bas Veth, a 
Dutch painter, after a conversation with Willem Johannes Leyds. In this document dated July 3rd 
1900, Veth describes a plan of how the Boer republics could persuade the European powers to 
intervene between the fighting parties. Although this research examines what Wilhelmina actually 
did for the Boers and their cause during the Second Anglo-Boer War, and therefore looks at her 
actions, a special role in this plan is reserved for Wilhelmina and therefore is worth mentioning.  
This plan states that the position of stadtholder, as it used to exist in the Netherlands before 
the French Revolution, over both the Orange Free State and the South African Republic (Transvaal) 
would be offered to Wilhelmina. Veth describes the position of stadtholder as a purely personal 
bond, without interference in the day-to-day affairs of the Boer republics. The stadtholder would 
ratify the chosen president, be informed about the chosen ministers and either represent the 
republics in foreign affairs or be informed about them. Russia, France and Germany, and if possible 
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the Netherlands and the United States, should guarantee this situation.182 Overall, the position of 
stadtholder was foremost a symbolic position without much legal base to act on.  
It was thought that Russia, because of their desire to end the conflict, would support this 
idea. In France it would find support as well. Amongst the American people, it was thought that this 
proposition was received with great sympathy, as they wanted the Boer republics to remain 
independent from British rule. But especially Germany would also support the idea, as the 
relationship between the Emperor and Wilhelmina was very close. This relationship might result in 
Germany taking the decisive step.183 
Veth’s plan was not only focused on provoking the intervention of the previously named 
European powers, but was already looking at the aftermath of the war as well. Veth states: “Revenge 
and bitterness and great misery will be the results of this war. A woman, working in the government 
can make the hate and bitterness disappear and ease the misery and a seal that this will happen lies 
in the name of the family that in the case of freedom has done such great services.”184 Veth believed 
that a woman was more suitable to normalize the situation in the Boer republics, and saw in 
Wilhelmina the ideal person, as she had done much for what he stated as the case of freedom.  
Although it is not clear to what extent Veth’s idea was supported by the South African 
Republic’s government, nor who knew about the plan, we can conclude that this idea was not known 
to the Netherlands, nor to any other European nation. Nor are references to this idea or document 
found either in the archives, or in the existing literature. However, this document demonstrates 
support for the idea of Wilhelmina playing an essential role, either active or symbolic, for the Boer 
effort. 
  
                                                          
182 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Collectie 119 Bas Veth, nummer toegang 2.21.167, inventarisnummer 128. 
183 NL-HaNA, Veth, 2.21.167, inv.nr. 128. 
184 Idem. “Wraak en verbittering en groote ellende zullen de gevolgen van dezen oorlog zijn. Eene vrouw, 
medewerkende in het staatsbestuur kan de haat en verbittering doen verdwijnen en de ellende lenigen en een 
waarborg dat dit zoo zal gebeuren ligt in den naam van het geslacht dat in de zaak der vrijheid zulke groote 
diensten heeft bewezen.”  
 53 
A comparison 
It seems clear that many European countries and their heads of state were supporting the Boer 
cause. The Dutch government generally tried to help the Boers without causing a possible diplomatic 
conflict with Great Britain. Wilhelmina herself wished to do more for the kinsmen on a different 
continent, but was limited by her position as queen of the Netherlands. 
To answer the question of what Wilhelmina actually did for the Boers and their cause, we 
have to understand her contribution in relation to that of other heads of state in Europe. It would be 
too much to compare every European nation and the United States. This chapter therefore compares 
the actions, positions and restrictions placed on Wilhelmina with those of the heads of state of two 
other major powers in Europe: Russia and Germany. As discussed throughout this research, 
Wilhelmina actively sought to collaborate with these nations.  
 
The position of head of state 
The three countries discussed in this chapter are all monarchies. However, there are multiple forms 
of monarchy. Germany was a federal constitutional monarchy and Russia was an absolute monarchy. 
The Netherlands, with Wilhelmina as the head of state, was a parliamentary constitutional 
monarchy. This means that the power lies with the head of state, the ministers and the parliament. 
However, the power of the head of state is very limited. Also, the head of state is inviolable, as the 
ministers were responsible for the acts of Wilhelmina. However, Wilhelmina needed permission from 
ministers when she acted on an official capacity.  
 Wilhelmina had only the ability to sign laws and therefore ratify them, and as previously 
stated she had right to command the armed forces and designate someone for the formation of a 
government. Wilhelmina used this power in 1901 to appoint Abraham Kuyper. But she first wanted 
Kuyper to agree that the policy in regard to the Aceh War and the neutral position of the Netherlands 
regarding the Second Anglo-Boer War remained as they were.185 Beyond this, she did not command 
any influence on the policies of the Netherlands. The real power rested with the Dutch parliament, 
which had the power to form and pass new laws, make foreign and interior policies and express 
statements on the policies of foreign nations. 
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 This was in sharp contrast with Germany. The 
German Empire was a federal constitutional monarchy, 
meaning that it consisted of multiple principalities, duchies 
and kingdoms, with Emperor Wilhelm II as the head of state 
and King of Prussia (the largest and strongest element of the 
federation) but with extended powers. Wilhelm ruled as an 
autocrat with divine right. He saw himself as the intermediary 
between God and his people, and therefore ignored all 
criticism. Although under the rule of his grandfather, Wilhelm 
I, the Reich Chancellor still possessed some power and 
influence, this changed from 1890 onwards.186 Wilhelm also 
had the power to determine the policy of both army and 
navy, which Wilhelmina could only do to a far lesser 
extent.187 Therefore, Wilhelm regarded the other monarchs 
in Europe, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Great Britain as “automatic signing 
machines”.188 
 The Russian Empire was similar to the German Empire, as Nicholas II was also an autocratic 
ruler, but he had to get used to his new position after his accession in 1894, which might explain his 
inconsistent early rule. Although an absolute monarchy, the Russian public believed that Nicholas 
would be a “softer and less autocratic” ruler then his predecessors.189 Representatives of the Tver 
zemstvo (Zemstvo were local rural governments) took this opportunity to propose something close 
to a constitutional regime. The autocrat in Nicholas emerged and he punished all who were involved. 
However, as stated in a biography of Nicholas II by Robert D. Warth, “Nicholas reigned but did not 
rule, at least in the pragmatic sense of providing effective and knowledgeable leadership.”190 The 
personalities of each individual minister and adviser had an impact on how Nicholas ruled Russia, in 
contrast to Germany, where Wilhelm ruled from his personal opinion, and the Netherlands where 
the parliament decided the policy. 
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Their actions 
As discussed in previous chapters, Wilhelmina wanted to do a lot in favour of the Boer cause, but 
could not do much because of her position as queen. That does not mean that she did not press the 
limits of the acceptable regarding her position. Regarding the letters sent by her to Queen Victoria, 
Emperor Wilhelm II and Tsar Nicholas II, it was concluded by van Raalte in his book Staatshoofd en 
ministers (Head of State and ministers) that she sometimes crossed those constitutional limits, likely 
by accident, as she asked Schorer during an audience on September 19th 1900 the difference 
between a personal and a political letter.191 A personal letter should only contain personal subjects 
that are written to an individual and not their position, and follow ordinary postal routes. A political 
letter contains official subjects written to a person’s position and sent through the official diplomatic 
channels, with (in the case of Wilhelmina) permission of a minister.192 However, one does not 
exclude the other. In his book, Van Raalte analyses  Wilhelmina’s letter to Queen Victoria on 
September 8th 1899, and Wilhelmina’s letter to Wilhelm II on March 20th. Van Raalte concludes that 
the letter to Victoria was not a personal letter. Wilhelmina had the authorisation of De Beaufort to 
write the letter; the letter went via official diplomatic channels; the discussed subject was not 
personal but political; and Wilhelmina appealed to Victoria’s “powerful influence”, meaning the 
position Victoria had.193 Wilhelmina’s letter to Wilhelm II was also in contradiction with the Dutch 
constitution. Wilhelmina was not authorised by De Beaufort or any other minister.194  
Because of their positions, Wilhelm and Nicholas were more free to act the way they wanted 
from a constitutional perspective. Germany had closer ties with the Boer republics since the First 
Anglo-Boer War. German companies sold weapons to them 
and invested in businesses. After the Jameson Raid, Wilhelm 
went on January 3rd 1896 to the Reich Chancellor’s palace 
and demanded dramatic action. As noted by the foreign 
secretary, Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, in his diary: “His 
Majesty developed some weird and wonderful plans. 
Protectorate over the Transvaal, which I at once talked him 
out of. Mobilisation of the marines. The sending of troops to 
the Transvaal. And on the objection of the Chancellor: “That 
would mean war with England,” His Majesty says: “yes, but 
only on land.” (…) Finally at my suggestion, His Majesty sent a 
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congratulatory telegram to President Kruger.”195 This so-called Kruger telegram tremendously 
damaged Anglo-German relations. The Germans continued to provide assistance to the Boers after 
the outbreak of war, providing intelligence and advice to the South African Republic’s government. 
196 However, aside from statements of sympathy, not much more was done. 
Wilhelm’s position even started to change. As he had previously supported the Boers, he now helped 
the British. During the conflict, the Anglo-German relationship started to improve, as the outcome of 
the war seemed more and more in favour of Great Britain. De Beaufort states in his diary, dated 
September 1900: “Germany is these days very close with England, because I even received 
sometimes messages from London via the German ambassador.”197 He even had sent Queen Victoria 
a campaign plan for defeating the Boers, a plan which included the infamous concentration camps 
and the scorched earth policy. The plan was used by Field Marshal Lord Roberts to secure victory in 
South Africa.198 
Meanwhile, Nicholas did not agree with Great Britain’s policy regarding the Boer republics, 
but Russia did not have major interests in South Africa.199 Despite the fact that he assured the British 
that Russia would not take advantage of their difficulties, he did consider pressing for gains in Asia. In 
a letter to his sister Xenia on October 9th 1899, he confessed that: “it is entirely in my hands to decide 
the ultimate course of the war in Africa”. All he needed to do was “telegraph orders to all the troops 
in Turkestan to mobilize and advance to the (Indian) frontier. That is all! No fleet in the world, 
however strong, can prevent us from striking at England at her most vulnerable point.”200  
Nicholas also wrote to King Edward VII on 22nd May, 1901, in which he expressed the opinion 
that it seemed more like a war of extermination.201 Despite Nicholas’s occasional expression of pro-
Boer feelings, Russia did not take action as contemplated in his letter to his sister. Besides the 
occasional messages of sympathy, Russia did not take the lead as a major European power in any 
kind of intervention. It seems that Wilhelmina was the only one who felt kindred with the Boers as 
opposed to looking to take advantage of British difficulties, as Russia and Germany did. 
 
British relations 
The three countries were cautious because of their relations with Great Britain. As previously stated, 
every nation in the world was to some extent depending on Great Britain, including the Netherlands. 
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Therefore, the Dutch government did everything possible not to offend the British government. The 
Dutch war in Aceh, which was only possible because of British support, finally started going well. 
Britain themselves were also interested in conquering that rich territory. Offending Great Britain 
might threaten Dutch domination over the island (or even all of the Dutch Indies and other Dutch 
colonies in the area). On top of that, the Dutch army was not able to fight a war against Great Britain, 
not overseas, nor in the Netherlands itself. However, this had nothing to do with the personal 
relationship between Queen Victoria and Queen Wilhelmina, who was her niece. The constitutional 
position of Wilhelmina, together with the international (weak) position of the Netherlands, might 
have as well influenced the Anglo-Dutch relations. Great Britain was aware of the pro-Boer opinions 
in the Netherlands, and of Wilhelmina personally. But Britain knew that Wilhelmina was limited by 
the parliament and their policy of neutrality, and furthermore that the Dutch actions were to ease 
the Dutch population as previously mentioned by the reaction of Sir Henry Howard, the British 
ambassador in The Hague, on the sending of the Gelderland.  
A close family tie might have contributed to the reserved actions by Germany and Russia. 
Wilhelm was a direct grand-child of Queen Victoria. However, the German interests stood in sharp 
contrast with those of Britain. The desire to expand in Africa and the construction of a large navy to 
do so were cautiously watched by the British government. 202 
Also Nicholas was a first cousin of the later British King George V. The two looked like twins. 
But then again, Russia’s interests in Asia were in conflict with those of Great Britain. Although not 
having a large navy, which was often seen as a requirement to defeat Great Britain, the Russians 
could attack Britain over land in Afghanistan, Persia and China.203 As previously stated, Russia assured 
Britain that it would not do so.  
 
Wilhelmina’s position as queen within a parliamentary constitutional monarchy greatly 
influenced her ability to act throughout the war. Despite the restrictions, she pressed the limits of 
what was acceptable regarding her position. She even crossed, either consciously or unconsciously, 
the line of her constitutional responsibilities by writing the German emperor without the consent of 
a minister. As autocratic rulers, Wilhelm II and Nicholas II were more free to act the way they 
desired. However, besides the occasional messages of sympathy, Russia and Germany did not take 
the lead as major European powers in any kind of intervention. Also, their support for the Boers 
diminished, as the war turned against the Boers. It seems that Wilhelmina was the only one who felt 
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kindred with the Boers as opposed to looking to take advantage of British difficulties as Russia and 
Germany did. Both leaders did not use the full extent of their powers as Wilhelmina did. 
However, the major difference between the Netherlands on one hand and Germany and 
Russia on the other was that Germany and Russia were in direct rivalry with Great Britain. Germany 
was trying to expand their international influence, especially in Africa, where Great Britain was 
omnipotent. The same counts for Asia, where Russia was trying to expand its influence. The 
Netherlands wanted to expand their influence on the present-day Indonesian islands, but they did 
that with Great Britain’s approval. The Dutch foreign policy was not focusing on expanding any 
further, thereby not challenging British influence on other aspects nor territory. Furthermore, the 
Netherlands as an internationally weak, insignificant nation would not be as threatening as a major 
European power such as Russia or Germany. Altogether, this means that Russia and Germany had a 
different agenda. By supporting the Boers, they were technically weakening the British position on 
the international stage, which opened opportunities for them to expand their influence. However, 
the Netherlands were looking after the continuation of their kinsmen on a different continent, 
thereby not challenging Britain’s power in South Africa or in the world as such.   
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Conclusion 
Despite founding the original cape colony and VOC refuelling stations, the Netherlands was never 
really interested in the region and this interest declined even further as Dutch maritime power, and 
power in general, waned. The Netherlands lost their leading position. Their empire had shrunk 
dramatically, and on a national level things were not much better. Although a small power, the 
Netherlands still had the characteristics of a great power. However, the country was far too weak to 
engage in power politics. It was not able to protect its colonial empire, nor the motherland in case of 
a conflict. The Netherlands had to follow a strict policy of neutrality. 
Wilhelmina grew up in a time in which Dutch interest in the Boers increased and Dutch 
nationalism was on the rise. Dutch nationalism was characterized by a new colonial interest, the 
kinship and struggle of the Boers, but more importantly a re-found pride in the Dutch royal family. 
Emma managed to increase the popularity of the royal family as a whole, but in particular that of 
Wilhelmina through well organised PR events. This made it possible for the young Wilhelmina to rise 
as the respected and loved international symbol of the Netherlands. At the same time, Wilhelmina 
grew up in a society which became increasingly anti-British. It was an atmosphere of re-found 
nationalism, pride and moralistic struggle that influenced her ideas and actions. As the tensions 
between the Boers and the British kept on rising, anti-British sentiments increased amongst 
Wilhelmina and the Dutch population.  
Because of the idea of kinship, mutual favourable disposition and Dutch support for the Boer 
cause, the Boers and Dutch saw themselves as family. Because of the renewed Dutch nationalism, 
which caused Wilhelmina to become the symbol of the Netherlands and everything that was Dutch, 
and that Dutch became synonymous for the Boers, Wilhelmina became one of the most profound 
advocates for the Boer cause on an international level.  
Despite her great sympathy for the Boers and her urge to help them in any way, Queen 
Wilhelmina was ironically limited by her position as queen to actually do anything. Also the Dutch 
government was limited by their policy of neutrality. This stood in sharp contrast with Germany and 
Russia, where Wilhelm II and Nicholas II were autocratic rulers, and were therefore more free to act 
the way they desired. Although both leaders expressed great sympathy for the Boer cause, their 
actions proved differently. As the war turned against the Boers, both Germany and Russia’s support 
diminished. Wilhelm II even sent a campaign plan to Queen Victoria for defeating the Boers. 
Although asked by Wilhelmina to take the initiative for mediation between the fighting parties, both 
declined. Also, both Wilhelm II and Nicholas II refused to receive Kruger or the Driemanschap 
(triumvirate) at their courts, while Wilhelmina received them with all honours. Wilhelmina, together 
with the Dutch government, continued their support for the Boers until the very end of the war. 
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However, the major difference between the Netherlands on one hand and Germany and 
Russia on the other was that Germany and Russia were in direct rivalry with Great Britain. Germany 
was trying to expand their international influence in Africa and Russia was trying to expend its 
influence in Asia. Both were threatening British influence. By supporting the Boers, they were 
technically weakening the British position on the international stage, which opened opportunities for 
them to expand their influence. Through the policy of neutrality and the absence of an aggressive 
expansion policy, the Netherlands were not a danger for British rule whatsoever. Furthermore, as an 
internationally weak, insignificant nation, the Netherlands would not be as threatening as a major 
European power such as Russia or Germany, and therefore was allowed to voice their disapproval 
over British policy in South Africa. 
Despite the opinion of the Dutch public, Wilhelmina and the government knew that first and 
foremost they had to protect the interest of the country. Therefore, they had to do everything to 
prevent the British from being offended, along with all its consequences. However, Wilhelmina did 
everything within her reach to help the Boers. Wilhelmina and the Dutch government did so by 
internationally promoting the Boer cause, receiving Kruger and the Boer representatives with all 
honours and using their contacts to help and promote the Boer cause. Wilhelmina wrote letters to 
Queen Victoria in an attempt to prevent war and wrote letters to the German Emperor and Russian 
Tsar to persuade them to mediate between the fighting parties and even informed for a potential 
Dutch military intervention. She even crossed, either consciously or unconsciously, the line of her 
constitutional responsibilities by writing the German emperor without the consent of a minister. The 
pièce de résistance of the Dutch support was the sending of the ironclad Gelderland, foremost a 
symbolic act. Of course, in an argument against Wilhelmina as the patroness of the Boer cause, one 
could argue that she did not take risks. She took comfortable decisions, of which the estimated 
results did not affect the Dutch interests. But that was what all the heads of state did. Wilhelmina 
distinguished herself by supporting the Boers until the very end of the conflict with a one-faced, 
honest and realistic agenda. It is therefore justified to state that Queen Wilhelmina of the 
Netherlands, through these actions, was able to overshadow the major powers and their heads of 
state, such as Germany and Russia. 
It is difficult to understand exactly what Wilhelmina meant by: “(…) but I have done more for 
the Boers than my fellow countrymen will ever know (…)”. The events in which Wilhelmina took part 
were often also the events which were accessible by the public and press. However, some events 
played in the higher political arena, such as interaction with heads of state and politicians such as De 
Beaufort and Schorer. These were not accessible for the press, nor by the public. It is also not clear if 
she is referring to one or multiple actions, or what these actions actually are. 
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Further research is needed which would analyse diaries, newspapers and other documents 
which were at that time widely used and accessible. Comparing Wilhelmina’s actions with what we 
find in these documents should provide a clearer image of what the public knew. Only then can we 
answer the question what the public did not know about Wilhelmina’s actions. 
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